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 GIVING UP THE GHOST:  
A PROPOSAL FOR DEALING WITH 
ATTORNEY “GHOSTWRITING” OF PRO SE 
LITIGANTS’ COURT DOCUMENTS 
THROUGH EXPLICIT RULES REQUIRING 
DISCLOSURE AND ALLOWING LIMITED 
APPEARANCES FOR SUCH ATTORNEYS 
MICHAEL W. LOUDENSLAGER

 
More and more pro se litigants are making their way to the courthouse.  Pro se litigants have 
become common, especially in state housing and family law courts and in federal bankruptcy court.  
In response, a growing number of attorneys have started providing unbundled or limited scope legal 
services to these litigants.  This involves a client hiring an attorney to perform a discrete task in a 
lawsuit and nothing else.  One particular form of discrete task legal services involves attorney 
“ghostwriting.”  In such arrangements, an attorney drafts pleadings or other court documents for 
pro se litigants.  However, the legal assistance that the client received goes unacknowledged, and the 
attorney remains unnamed on the documents when filed with the court.  The pro se litigant then goes 
on to conduct the litigation on his or her own. 
However, court opinions resoundingly have condemned this conduct.  Meanwhile, ethics 
opinions dealing with the issue largely have instructed attorneys to disclose at least the nature of the 
assistance provided to the litigant, if not the attorney’s actual identity.  Nevertheless, the ethics 
opinions in some jurisdictions have approved of this activity, and some commentators continue to 
advocate for attorney ghostwriting. 
Even so, courts and the legal bar should not sacrifice attorneys’ ethical duties in a desperate 
attempt to deal with the rising tide of pro se litigants by formally acknowledging and acquiescing to 
undisclosed attorney ghostwriting of court documents for pro se litigants.  Instead, this Article 
concludes that the duty that an attorney owes to a court to be truthful and candid, to avoid dishonest 
behavior generally, and to certify the legitimacy of the facts and legal arguments contained in court 
documents ultimately prohibits ghostwriting.  Therefore, courts should require an attorney to 
acknowledge the drafting assistance that he or she has provided to the client and to reveal the 
attorney’s identity on the pro se litigant’s court documents concerned. 
At the same time, such participation should qualify only as a limited appearance, and express 
rules should exist affirming this.  Otherwise, attorneys will be reluctant to provide limited legal 
services to pro se litigants due to the fear that a court will determine such activity constitutes making 
 

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a general appearance in the litigation and will keep attorneys “on the hook” for representing the 
client throughout the entire lawsuit.  Only by enacting both of these reforms can jurisdictions hold 
attorneys to the important duties owed to both the court system and third parties while 
simultaneously encouraging attorneys to provide limited legal services to pro se litigants. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
More and more pro se litigants are making their way to the courthouse.
1
  
Readers envisioning hordes of vexatious, unrepresented parties suing 
everybody from executive department officials to legislators to judges to 
 
1. See infra Part II (discussing growth of pro se litigation). 
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opposing attorneys (to the mothers of each of these individuals) for a 
perceived unjust result in prior litigation or some other perceived wrong 
should reconsider.  For various reasons,
2
 pro se litigants dealing with 
ordinary, everyday legal issues have become common in state housing and 
family law courts and in federal bankruptcy court, among other venues.
3
  In 
response, a growing number of attorneys have started providing unbundled or 
limited scope legal services.
4
  This involves a client hiring an attorney to 
perform a discrete task in a lawsuit, but otherwise the client conducts the 
litigation on his or her own.
5
  One particular form of discrete task legal 
 
2. A debate exists concerning whether the rise in pro se litigants has arisen simply due to 
individuals of low and moderate income being unable to afford full-service legal representation, see 
infra notes 19–21 and accompanying text (discussing the unmet demand for legal services from those 
of low to moderate means), or whether pro se litigants more predominantly go unrepresented due to 
personal preference and despite being able to afford full legal representation, see infra notes 26–28 
and accompanying text (discussing reasons other than finances that some litigants may choose to 
proceed unrepresented in court proceedings). 
3. See infra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
4. Margaret Graham Tebo, Scary Parts of Ghostwriting, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2007, at 16. 
5. See Rochelle Klempner, Unbundled Legal Services in New York State Litigated Matters: A 
Proposal to Test the Efficacy Through Law School Clinics, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 653, 
654 (2006) (―Unbundled legal services, also described as ‗discrete task representation‘ or ‗limited 
scope legal assistance,‘ is a practice in which the lawyer and client agree that the lawyer will provide 
some, but not all, of the work involved in traditional full-service representation.  Simply put, the 
lawyers perform[] only the agreed upon tasks, rather than the whole ‗bundle,‘ and the clients perform 
the remaining tasks on their own.‖); Tebo, supra note 4, at 16 (describing ―unbundling‖ as ―lawyers 
agree[ing] to be responsible for only carefully delineated portions of a client‘s case‖); John C. 
Rothermich, Note, Ethical and Procedural Implications of “Ghostwriting” for Pro Se Litigants: 
Toward Increased Access to Civil Justice, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2687, 2691 (1999) (―According to 
the unbundled model, lawyers provide a prospective client with a choice of assistance from a list of 
discrete legal tasks, instead of the traditional full-service package.‖). 
 The ABA Standing Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services provided the following 
medical services analogy to help explain potential clients‘ ―continuum of need‖ for unbundled legal 
services: 
 
A person with a headache is not encouraged to begin his or her response to that 
pain with an appointment with a brain surgeon.  Instead, people will use self-
help methods to become educated on the range of services and products 
available for pain relief.  The first professional consulted is more likely to be a 
pharmacist, for a recommendation for over-the-counter medication.  When the 
problem persists, people may then go to their personal physician.  In a few 
cases, that doctor will refer the patient to a specialist.  Similarly, in a complex 
society with pervasive legal implications to everyday transactions, the 
continuum of legal services suggests that most legal matters are handled 
through self-help.  Occasionally, people have a need for legal assistance, and as 
matters move through the continuum, some will have the need for the 
representation of a lawyer. 
ABA STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., REPORT ON THE PUBLIC HEARING ON 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE 4 (2003), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/delivery/reportpublichearingonaccesstojustice.pdf 
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services involves attorney ―ghostwriting.‖  In such arrangements, an attorney 
drafts pleadings or other court documents for pro se litigants, but the legal 
assistance that the client receives goes unacknowledged and the attorney 
remains unnamed on the documents themselves when the pro se litigant files 
them with the court.
6
  The pro se litigant then goes on to conduct the litigation 
or argue the motion concerned on his or her own. 
However, court opinions have resoundingly condemned ghostwriting.
7
  
Meanwhile, ethics opinions dealing with the issue largely have instructed 
attorneys to disclose at least the nature of the assistance provided to the 
litigant, if not the attorney‘s actual identity.8  Nevertheless, the ethics opinions 
in some jurisdictions have approved of this activity, and some commentators 
continue to advocate for courts to allow attorney ghostwriting.
9
 
Even so, courts should not sacrifice attorneys‘ ethical duties out of 
desperation in order to deal with the rising tide of pro se litigants and 
acquiesce in undisclosed attorney ghostwriting of court documents for pro se 
litigants.  Instead, this Article concludes the duty that an attorney owes to a 
court to be truthful and candid,
10
 to avoid dishonest behavior generally,
11
 and 
to certify the legitimacy of the facts and legal arguments contained in court 
documents,
12
 implicitly prohibits this practice.  However, courts should be 
more explicit in requiring attorneys to acknowledge the drafting assistance 
that they have provided to clients and to reveal the attorney‘s identity on the 
pro se litigant‘s court documents concerned.13  At the same time, courts 
should promulgate rules that allow such participation to qualify as only a 
limited appearance, or no appearance at all, and refrain from compelling such 
attorneys to provide services beyond those the client originally contracted 
from the attorney.
14
  Otherwise, attorneys will be reluctant to provide limited 
legal services to litigants otherwise proceeding pro se.  By enacting both of 
 
[hereinafter ABA HEARING REPORT]. 
6. See Klempner, supra note 5, at 658 (―The practice whereby attorneys draft court documents 
for clients who represent themselves in court, where the court papers do not reveal that an attorney 
assisted in their preparation, is known as ‗ghostwriting.‘‖); Tebo, supra note 4, at 16 (describing 
―ghostwriting‖ as where ―a lawyer drafts court papers for a client but does not enter an official 
appearance in the case‖); Rothermich, supra note 5, at 2692 (―One particular form of limited legal 
assistance, known as ‗ghostwriting,‘ consists of the drafting of pleadings and other court documents 
by attorneys for clients who go on to represent themselves in court pro se. . . .  The documents are 
then filed by the litigant herself, and the attorney has no further involvement with the case.‖). 
7. See infra Part IV.A. 
8. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
9. See infra Part IV.B.3.c. 
10. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2002). 
11. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2002). 
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
13. See infra Part V. 
14. See infra Part V. 
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these reforms, courts can hold attorneys to the important duties owed to the 
court system while simultaneously encouraging attorneys to provide limited 
legal services to pro se litigants. 
In reaching this conclusion, Part II of this Article examines the relatively 
recent growth in the number of pro se litigants and discusses some of the 
possible causes of this phenomenon.  Part III presents the main ethics rules 
that attorney ghostwriting potentially violates.  Part IV considers the reaction 
of the courts, various ethics committees, and commentators to attorney 
ghostwriting of pro se litigants‘ court documents.  Part V then presents 
recommendations for dealing with attorney ghostwriting and the policy 
rationales supporting these recommendations. 
II.  GROWTH OF PRO SE LITIGATION 
Courts, especially those dealing with housing, family, and bankruptcy 
matters, have experienced significant growth in the number of pro se litigants 
appearing before them in recent years.
15
  In fact, the majority of litigants in 
these types of cases now proceed pro se without the use of an attorney.
16
  
Moreover, as many as eighty percent of these matters involve pro se litigants 
in some jurisdictions.
17
  An American Bar Association (ABA) task force has 
noted that ―[n]ationally, in three or four out of every five [family law] cases, 
one of the two parties is unrepresented‖ and that ―both parties are 
unrepresented in two or three out of every five cases.‖18 
One explanation for this increase in parties proceeding pro se is that 
people of low to middle income levels simply cannot afford an attorney to 
represent them.
19
  For example, two-thirds of respondents to one survey 
 
15. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 14 (2004); Handbook on Limited Scope Legal 
Assistance: A Report of the Modest Means Task Force, 2003 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. 8 [hereinafter 
Modest Means Task Force]. 
16. RHODE, supra note 15, at 14; see also Drew A. Swank, In Defense of Rules and Roles: The 
Need to Curb Extreme Forms of Pro Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1537, 1539 (2005) (―[I]n some state courts—those that handle traffic, landlord/tenant, and child 
support or other domestic relations issues, the number of cases in which at least one side is pro se far 
outnumber those in which counsel represent both parties.‖); Brenda Star Adams, Note, “Unbundled 
Legal Services”: A Solution to the Problems Caused by Pro Se Litigation in Massachusetts’s Civil 
Courts, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 303, 314 (2005) (―A 1997 study of pro se litigation in Probate and 
Family Court in twelve Massachusetts counties found that more than two-thirds of all cases included 
at least one pro se litigant.‖). 
17. RHODE, supra note 15, at 14; see also Swank, supra note 16, at 1539 (―In many of these 
courts, eighty to ninety percent of cases involve at least one pro se litigant.‖); Adams, supra note 16, 
at 314 (noting a ―1997 study of the Northeast Housing Court found that seventy-nine percent of 
litigants appeared without counsel‖). 
18. Modest Means Task Force, supra note 15, at 8. 
19. See ABA HEARING REPORT, supra note 5, at 4 (―Substantial evidence indicates the 
existence of a latent marketplace for personal civil legal services to those of low and moderate 
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―agree[d] that it [was] ‗not affordable to bring a case to court.‘‖20  According 
to one survey conducted in Maryland, three-quarters of people of middle 
income do not contact an attorney when they have a legal problem.
21
  
Furthermore, this lack of representation likely increases litigants‘ 
dissatisfaction with the legal system.  One survey indicated that up to seventy-
five percent of people who had a legal need but did not retain an attorney 
were dissatisfied with the outcome in their matter.
22
  Another survey indicated 
that only about one-half of people of middle income were happy with the 
result when proceeding pro se.
23
  This contrasts with the satisfaction that 
people who obtain legal representation experience with the judicial system.  
One survey‘s results indicated that two-thirds of people who retained counsel 
to deal with their legal problems were satisfied with the outcome.
24
 
One commentator, though, has expressed reasons for the growth in pro se 
litigants other than the lack of affordable legal services.  Drew Swank has 
asserted that the growth in pro se litigants exemplifies predominantly a 
preference for ―doing-it-yourself‖ that results from several factors, including a 
distrust of attorneys and the legal system, an ―increased sense of 
consumerism,‖ and an increase in availability of forms and other assistance 
for pro se litigants.
25
  Swank even contends that some people may proceed pro 
se ―as a trial strategy designed to gain either sympathy or a procedural 
 
incomes.‖); WILLIAM HORNSBY, IMPROVING THE DELIVERY OF AFFORDABLE LEGAL SERVICES 
THROUGH THE INTERNET: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE SHIFT TO A DIGITAL PARADIGM 3 (1999), 
available at http://www.unbundledlaw.org/program/11%20-%20Lawyering%20over%20web%20-
%20hornsby.pdf (―[Fifty-seven] percent of pro se litigants [in Maryland] proceeded pro se because 
they could not afford a lawyer.‖); Tebo, supra note 4, at 17 (quoting James McCauley, ethics counsel 
for the Virginia State Bar, as stating that ―the people most likely to seek unbundled services tend to 
do so solely for financial reasons‖); Adams, supra note 16, at 304 (―[T]he majority of pro se litigants 
[represent themselves] because they cannot afford a lawyer.‖); Cristina L. Underwood, Comment, 
Balancing Consumer Interests in a Digital Age: A New Approach to Regulating the Unauthorized 
Practice of Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 437, 442 (2004) (―Many low- and moderate-income households 
simply cannot afford the cost of personal legal services.‖); see also Rothermich, supra note 5, at 
2688 (―[I]t is estimated that legal services organizations were forced to deny over half of their 
eligible clients any assistance due to inadequate resources.‖). 
20. RHODE, supra note 15, at 80. 
21. Id. at 79; see also Rothermich, supra note 5, at 2688 (―[L]ow income households‘ legal 
problems involved the judicial system only twenty-nine percent of the time‖ and ―[f]or legal 
problems of households defined as moderate-income, and thus categorically ineligible for most free 
legal services, the judicial system was involved only thirty-nine percent of the time.‖). 
22. Modest Means Task Force, supra note 15, at 14 n.30 (citing the results of an Oregon 
survey). 
23. RHODE, supra note 15, at 80. 
24. Id. 
25. Swank, supra note 16, at 1574–75 (listing twelve factors leading to the such growth); see 
also Jona Goldschmidt, In Defense of Ghostwriting, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1145, 1145 (2002) 
(―[T]he growth of pro se litigation . . . can be attributed to the high cost of litigation, anti-lawyer 
sentiment, and the advent of do-it-yourself law kits, books, and web sites.‖). 
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advantage over represented parties.‖26  Swank further notes that ―[u]ltimately 
it may be the simplicity of the cases and the nature of the jurisdiction [in 
terms of the availability of certain types of non-traditional legal assistance for 
the type of matter concerned], more than the characteristics of the litigants, 
that determines whether individuals represent[] themselves or not.‖27 
Regardless of the true cause of the rise in pro se litigants in our courts, be 
it lack of affordability of legal services or a conscious choice by litigants who 
can afford legal representation, this phenomenon is extensive enough to merit 
a response from attorneys and courts.  The rest of this Article deals with the 
appropriateness of one reaction to this phenomenon—attorney ghostwriting of 
court documents—and provides some recommendations for dealing with this 
activity. 
III.   ETHICS RULES THAT GHOSTWRITING IMPLICATES 
The current version of Model Rule 1.2(c) expressly allows for the 
provision of limited scope legal services as long as ―the limitation is 
reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.‖28  
However, Rule 1.2(c) does not address attorney ghostwriting.  Several other 
ethics rules are potentially applicable to attorney ghostwriting of nominal pro 
se litigants‘ court documents.  While none expressly forbid such conduct, 
these rules can serve as the basis for concluding that attorney ghostwriting of 
documents without disclosure to the court is prohibited ethically. 
A.  Model Rule 3.3: “Candor Toward the Tribunal” 
One of the most applicable rules is Model Rule 3.3, entitled ―Candor 
Toward the Tribunal.‖29  Section (a) of this rule states that  ―[a] lawyer shall 
not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to 
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the 
tribunal by the lawyer.‖30  Section (b) of Rule 3.3 goes on to state that an 
attorney representing a client in ―an adjudicative proceeding . . . who knows 
that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or 
fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial 
measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.‖31  The rule goes 
on to state that these duties ―apply even if compliance requires disclosure of 
 
26. Swank, supra note 16, at 1575. 
27. Id. at 1575–76. 
28. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2002). 
29. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002). 
30. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2002). 
31. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2002). 
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information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6,‖32 which deals with protection 
of confidential information.  Furthermore, a comment to Rule 3.3 states that 
―[t]here are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent 
of an affirmative misrepresentation.‖33 
Another comment points out that the purpose of the rule is for attorneys 
―to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process.‖34  
Thus, the key to whether attorney ghostwriting of court documents for 
nominal pro se litigants without disclosure violates this rule appears to be 
whether such conduct ―undermines the integrity of the adjudicative 
process.‖35  However, in discussing attorneys‘ ―obligation to protect a tribunal 
against criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the 
adjudicative process,‖ the comment discusses activity ―such as bribing, 
intimidating or otherwise unlawfully communicating with a witness, juror, 
court official or other participant in the proceeding, unlawfully destroying or 
concealing documents or other evidence or failing to disclose information to 
the tribunal when required by law to do so.‖36  The mentioned activity seems 
more severe than ghostwriting of documents for pro se litigants, but the 
comment does not provide an exhaustive list of conduct that would affect the 
integrity of the judicial process. 
B.  Rules Generally Proscribing Involvement in Fraud on the Part of 
Attorneys 
Although Model Rule 3.3 directly addresses representations made to the 
court and protecting the integrity of the judicial system, several rules more 
generally proscribe an attorney from participating in fraudulent activity.  
Model Rule 8.4, entitled ―Misconduct,‖ states that ―[i]t is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.‖37  Similarly, Model Rule 4.1, entitled 
―Truthfulness in Statements to Others,‖ provides: 
 
32. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c) (2002).  The nearest Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility equivalent was DR 7-102(A)(5), entitled ―Representing a Client Within 
the Bounds of Law,‖ which stated, ―In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall 
not . . . [k]nowingly make a false statement of law or fact.‖  MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(5) (1980). 
33. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 3 (2002). 
34. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 2 (2002). 
35. Id. 
36. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 12 (2002).  The comment is consistent 
with the standard definition of ―fraud on the court,‖ which is ―[a] scheme to interfere with judicial 
machinery performing [the] task of impartial adjudication‖ and which usually requires egregious 
conduct, ―such as bribery of a judge or jury,‖ that ―undermines the integrity of the judicial process.‖  
BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (6th ed. 1990). 
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2002).  This language is very similar to DR 
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In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not 
knowingly: 
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third 
person; or 
(b) fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is 
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a 
client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.
38
 
 
Moreover, Model Rule 1.2(d) prohibits an attorney from ―counsel[ing] a 
client to engage, or assist[ing] a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is 
criminal or fraudulent.‖39  A comment to Rule 1.2 provides that a ―lawyer is 
required to avoid assisting the client, for example, by drafting or delivering 
documents that the lawyer knows are fraudulent or by suggesting how the 
wrongdoing might be concealed.‖40  Furthermore, a comment to Model Rule 
3.3 notes that the obligation set out in Rule 1.2(d) ―applies in litigation.‖41  
Finally, Model Rule 1.6, dealing with an attorney‘s duty of confidentiality, 
allows disclosure of confidential information in order to prevent or remedy 
client fraud related to the attorney‘s provision of legal services to that client.42  
Therefore, not only is an attorney prohibited from making misrepresentations 
to the court, but attorneys are prohibited generally from acting fraudulently or 
from assisting others to act in this manner.  Additionally, an attorney can 
disclose confidential information in order to prevent, mitigate, or remedy 
instances of fraud that are imminent or have in fact occurred. 
C.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) 
Beyond the ethics rules that govern attorney conduct, Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 11(b) may be applicable to attorneys who ghostwrite 
documents for pro se litigants without disclosure.  Rule 11(b) states that ―[b]y 
 
1-102(A)(4) of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, also entitled ―Misconduct,‖ which 
stated, ―(A) A lawyer shall not: . . . (4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation.‖  MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4) (1980). 
38. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2002). 
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002). 
40. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) cmt. 10 (2002). 
41. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 3 (2002). 
42. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2), (3) (2003) (―A lawyer may reveal‖ 
confidential client information ―to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to prevent 
the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to 
the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is 
using the lawyer‘s services‖ or ―to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial 
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client‘s 
commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer‘s services.‖). 
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presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper . . . an 
attorney . . . certifies that to the best of the [attorney‘s] knowledge, 
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances‖ that the document is not ―being presented for any improper 
purpose,‖ that ―the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted 
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for . . . establishing new law‖ 
and that ―the factual contentions have evidentiary support.‖43  As set out 
below, several courts have held that attorneys who ghostwrite court 
documents for nominal pro se litigants improperly avoid this obligation under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) to certify that a reasonable basis exists 
for both the facts and legal arguments presented in the document concerned.
44
 
IV.  LEGAL AUTHORITY DIRECTLY ADDRESSING ATTORNEY GHOSTWRITING 
OF COURT DOCUMENTS 
Although the various ethics rules that govern attorney conduct do not 
directly address the propriety of attorney ghostwriting of documents for a 
nominal pro se litigant, several cases and state and local ethics opinions have 
explicitly dealt with the issue.  Courts have overwhelmingly condemned 
attorney ghostwriting of court documents.
45
  The ABA, though, recently 
changed its official stance on the issue.
46
  While an earlier ABA ethics 
opinion required disclosure,
47
 a recent opinion concluded that attorney 
ghostwriting of documents for litigants holding themselves out to the court as 
pro se is appropriate and does not require disclosure.
48
  Nevertheless, the 
majority of the state and local ethics committees that have addressed the issue 
have called for disclosure to the court when attorneys draft pleadings or briefs 
for pro se parties.
49
  However, there is some disagreement as to the extent of 
the disclosure that needs to be made, with some ethics committees requiring 
that the attorney only disclose that ghostwriting has occurred, while others 
additionally require that the attorney disclose his or her identity to the court.
50
  
There also is some disagreement as to how extensively the attorney must aid 
the pro se litigant before disclosure of any kind needs to be made.
51
  Despite 
 
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).  This Article refers to the version of Rule 11 in effect prior to 
December 1, 2007. 
44. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing case law applying certifications of Rule 11 to attorney 
ghostwriting). 
45. See infra Part IV.A. 
46. See infra Part IV.B.1–2. 
47. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
48. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
49. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
50. See infra Part IV.B.3.a–b. 
51. See infra notes 123–24, 136–38, 141–42 and accompanying text. 
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the large amount of authority concluding that ethics rules prohibit attorney 
ghostwriting, some commentators continue to advocate against requiring any 
type of attorney disclosure of such activity and raise novel arguments 
supporting this stance.
52
 
A.  Condemnation by the Courts 
The overwhelming majority of courts to address the issue have prohibited 
attorneys from engaging in the undisclosed ghostwriting of court documents 
for otherwise pro se litigants.
53
  Courts have used four main policy rationales 
for coming to this conclusion, which are set out below. 
1.  Undisclosed Ghostwriting Involves a Misrepresentation to the Court and 
Provides the Nominal Pro Se Litigant with an Unfair Advantage 
Several courts have held that attorneys who ghostwrite court documents 
for pro se litigants without disclosing this conduct to the court make a 
misrepresentation to the court
54
 and violate applicable attorney ethics rules.
55
  
 
52. See infra Part IV.C. 
53. See infra Part IV.A.1–4. 
54. Barnett v. LeMaster, 12 F. App‘x 774, 778–79 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that where the party 
―entered a pro se appearance as well as filed and signed his appeal pro se, the attorney who drafted 
the brief knowingly committed a gross misrepresentation to this court‖); Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 
1268, 1272 (10th Cir. 2001) (determining that attorney ghostwriting of pro se litigant‘s appellate 
brief ―constitute[d] a misrepresentation to this court by litigant and attorney‖); Laremont-Lopez v. 
Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (E.D. Va. 1997) (finding that attorney 
ghostwriting of pro se litigants‘ complaints ―constitute[d] a misrepresentation to the Court‖); United 
States v. Eleven Vehicles, 966 F. Supp. 361, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (―Clearly, the party‘s representation 
to the Court that he is pro se is not true when the pleadings are being prepared by the lawyer.  A 
lawyer should not silently acquiesce to such representation.‖); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 769 
(Bankr. D.S.C. 2003) (―[T]his Court prohibits attorneys from ghost-writing pleadings and motions 
for litigants that appear pro se because such an act is a misrepresentation that violates an attorney‘s 
duty and professional responsibility to provide the utmost candor toward the Court.‖); see also 
Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm‘rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1232 (D. Colo. 1994) (―Having a lit igant 
appear to be pro se when in truth an attorney is authoring pleadings and necessarily guiding the 
course of the litigation with an unseen hand . . . is far below the level of candor which must be met 
by members of the bar.‖), aff’d, 85 F.3d 489 (10th Cir. 1995); In re Merriam, 250 B.R. 724, 733 
(Bankr. D. Colo. 2000) (finding that attorney ghostwriting of pro se lit igant‘s court documents 
violates the attorney‘s ―duty of honesty and candor to the court‖). 
55. Anderson v. Duke Energy Corp., No. 3:06cv399, 2007 WL 4284904, at *1 n.1 (W.D.N.C. 
Dec. 4, 2007) (―The practice of ‗ghostwriting‘ by an attorney for a party who otherwise professes to 
be pro se is disfavored and considered by many courts to be unethical.‖); Delso v. Trs. for 
Retirement Plan for Hourly Employees of Merck & Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, at *17 
(D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007) (finding that ghostwriting attorney‘s ―failure to affirmatively advise the Court 
of his informal assistance of [the nominal pro se litigant], and [that litigant‘s] subsequent submission 
to the Court under her own signature was not emblematic of the candid honesty contemplated by 
[New Jersey‘s] RPC 3.3‖); Ostevoll v. Ostevoll, No. C-1-99-961, 2000 WL 1611123, at *9 (S.D. 
Ohio Aug. 16, 2000) (―Ghostwriting of legal documents by attorneys on behalf of litigants who state 
that they are proceeding pro se has been held to be inconsistent with the intent of procedural, ethical 
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The main rationale for this conclusion is that this conduct provides pro se 
litigants with an unfair advantage against their opponent because courts are 
more forgiving when interpreting pro se parties‘ court documents and when 
applying its procedural rules to pro se litigants.
56
 
It is well established that a court must construe pro se litigants‘ documents 
more liberally than it would otherwise if legal counsel for a party had drafted 
the documents.
57
  This rule applies not only during the initial stages of the 
 
and substantive rules of the Court.‖); Eleven Vehicles, 966 F. Supp. at 367 (―[P]articipating in a ghost 
writing arrangement such as this, where the lawyer drafts the pleadings and the party signs them, 
implicates the lawyer‘s duty of candor to the Court.‖); Johnson, 868 F. Supp. at 1232 (finding that 
attorney ghostwriting ―will not be countenanced because it is contrary to Colorado Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.2(d) which provides ‗[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist 
a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent‘‖); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. at 770 
(―The act of ghost-writing violates SCRPC Rule 3.3(a)(2) and SCRPC Rule 8.4(d) because assisting 
a litigant to appear pro se when in truth an attorney is authoring pleadings and necessarily managing 
the course of the litigation while cloaked in anonymity is plainly deceitful, dishonest, and far below 
the level of disclosure and candor this Court expects from members of the bar.‖). 
56. See Delso, 2007 WL 766349, at *13 (―Simply stated, courts often act as referees charged 
with ensuring a fair fight.  This becomes an obvious problem when the Court is giving extra latitude 
to a purported pro se litigant who is receiving secret professional help.‖); Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. 
Supp. at 1078 (―When, however, complaints drafted by attorneys are filed bearing the signature of a 
plaintiff outwardly proceeding pro se . . . [t]he pro se plaintiff enjoys the benefit of the legal counsel 
while also being subjected to the less stringent standard reserved for those proceeding without the 
benefit of counsel.  This situation places the opposing party at an unfair disadvantage, [and] 
interferes with the efficient administration of justice . . . .‖); Johnson, 868 F. Supp. at 1231 (stating 
that the pro se litigant‘s ―pleadings seemingly filed pro se but drafted by an attorney would give him 
the unwarranted advantage of having a liberal pleading standard applied whilst holding the plaintiffs 
to a more demanding scrutiny‖ and that ―[t]he entire process would be skewed to the distinct 
disadvantage of the nonoffending party‖); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. at 769 (―[F]ederal courts generally 
interpret pro se documents liberally and afford greater latitude as a matter of judicial discretion.  
Allowing a pro se litigant to receive such latitude in addition to assistance from an attorney would 
disadvantage the non-offending party.‖); In re Merriam, 250 B.R. at 733 (―When an attorney has the 
client sign a pleading that the attorney prepared, the attorney creates the impression that the client 
drafted the pleading. . . .  [T]he situation ‗places the opposing party at an unfair disadvantage‘ and 
‗interferes with the efficient administration of justice.‘‖); see also Klein v. H. N. Whitney, Goadby & 
Co., 341 F. Supp. 699, 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (―[E]njoying the assistance of a lawyer or lawyers who 
have not formally appeared in this case . . . is grossly unfair to both this court and the opposing 
lawyers and should not be countenanced.‖); Rothermich, supra note 5, at 2697 (―[I]f courts 
mistakenly believe that the ghostwritten pleading was drafted without legal assistance, they might 
apply an unwarranted degree of leniency to a pleading that was actually drafted with the assistance of 
counsel.‖). 
57. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 15 (1980) (―An unrepresented litigant should not be 
punished for his failure to recognize subtle factual or legal deficiencies in his claims.‖); Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (―The handwritten pro se document is to be liberally construed.‖); 
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (stating that the Supreme Court holds a pro se litigant‘s 
complaint ―to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers‖); see also Burgos v. 
Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994) (―Because Burgos is a pro se litigant, we read his 
supporting papers liberally, and will interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they 
suggest.‖); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep‘t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988) (―In civil 
rights cases where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and 
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litigation pursuant to a motion to dismiss, but throughout the course of the 
lawsuit, including the summary judgment stage.
58
  Furthermore, courts will 
provide pro se litigants with more leeway in meeting procedural deadlines
59
 
 
must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.‖); Bates v. Jean, 745 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(―Pro se litigants are commonly required to comply with standards less stringent than those applied 
to expertly trained members of the legal profession.‖). 
 ―[T]his rule means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on 
which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so despite the plaintiff‘s failure to cite proper legal 
authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his 
unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.‖  Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).  
However, there is a limit to the amount of leeway that courts will provide to the documents of pro se 
litigants.  For example, courts are not supposed to ―construct arguments or theories for the [litigant] 
in the absence of any discussion of those issues,‖ Whayne v. Kansas, 980 F. Supp. 387, 393 (D. Kan. 
1997) (quoting Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991)), or ―supply 
additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff‘s complaint,‖ Whayne, 980 F. Supp. at 393 
(quoting Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173–74 (10th Cir. 1997)).  But see Fiore v. City 
of N.Y., No. 97 CIV.4935(WK), 1998 WL 755134, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1998) (―Though 
plaintiff invokes Title VII as his only federal cause of action in the 1995 [New York State Division 
of Human Rights] complaint, we believe in light of the liberal construction typically afforded to pro 
se litigants, we could construe that complaint to invoke the protections of the ADA.‖).  Moreover, 
―[t]he broad reading of the plaintiff‘s complaint does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of 
alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based. . . . [C]onclusory 
allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can 
be based.‖  Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. 
 However, at least one federal district court will not read the pleadings of a pro se litigant 
liberally when the party is a repetitive litigant.  See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Burge, No. 06-cv-0176, 
2008 WL 850677, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2008) (―‗[T]here are circumstances where an overly 
litigious inmate, who is quite familiar with the legal system and with pleading requirements, may not 
be afforded [the] special solicitude‘ or status that is normally afforded pro se litigants.‖) (quoting 
Smith v. Burge, No. 03-cv-0955, 2006 WL 2805242, at *3 n.3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2006)). 
58. See Overton v. United States, 925 F.2d 1282, 1283 (10th Cir. 1991) (construing ―the 
plaintiff‘s pro se pleadings liberally‖ upon considering the propriety of the district court having 
granted summary judgment on the pro se party‘s claims); Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110 n.3 (―The Haines 
rule applies to all proceedings involving a pro se litigant, including . . . summary judgment 
proceedings.‖); Graham v. Lewinski, 848 F.2d 342, 344 (2d Cir. 1988) (―This court has recently 
stated that special solicitude should be afforded pro se litigants generally, when confronted with 
motions for summary judgment.‖); Richardson v. Kelaher, No. 97 CIV.0428, 1998 WL 812042, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1998) (judging a pro se plaintiff‘s ―pleadings by a more lenient standard than that 
accorded to ‗formal pleadings drafted by lawyers‘‖ in deciding whether to grant the defendants‘ 
motion for summary judgment) (quoting Haines, 404 U.S. at 520); see also Madyun v. Thompson, 
657 F.2d 868, 877 (7th Cir. 1981) (―Adequate knowledge of both the right to file and the necessity of 
filing counter-affidavits to oppose summary judgment is critical to the pro se litigant‘s access to a 
just disposition of the merits of his claim.‖).  
59. See Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 94–95 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that the trial court 
improperly entered default judgment against a pro se defendant when the defendant filed an answer, 
albeit after the required twenty days subsequent service of the complaint, that presented ―meritorious 
defenses to most of the counts alleged in the complaint‖ and ―there were no grounds for finding that 
[the pro se defendant‘s] default was willful and plaintiffs neither alleged nor proved prejudice‖); 
Delso, 2007 WL 766349, at *13 (―Courts often extend the leniency given to pro se litigants in filing 
their pleadings to other procedural rules which attorneys are required to follow.‖).  
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and in preserving issues for appeal.
60
  Courts also are required to provide pro 
se litigants with additional instruction about deficiencies in their court 
documents before dismissing their claims.
61
  Stated succinctly, courts simply 
do not require pro se litigants to adhere to procedural requirements in the 
same manner required of members of the bar.
62
 
Moreover, it often can be difficult for courts to figure out whether an 
attorney has drafted a document or whether a particularly adept pro se litigant 
has written it, unless someone with actual knowledge of the attorney‘s 
conduct steps forward and gives affirmative testimony to this effect.  One 
court stated that ―[i]n the past, this Court has suspected, but has been unable 
to confirm that some plaintiffs outwardly proceeding pro se were in fact 
receiving the assistance of trained legal counsel.‖63  Another court stated that 
it ―[could not] reach any definitive conclusion‖ about whether the party had 
―misrepresent[ed] her status as a pro se defendant in order to obtain more 
leeway as an unrepresented party.‖64  This was despite the fact that the party 
―claimed a limited ability to use the English language‖ and that her ―pleadings 
before [the] court and the district court demonstrate[d] an obvious legal 
sophistication, a complete familiarity with the rules of civil procedure, and an 
excellent command of the English language.‖65  Thus, some courts genuinely 
struggle to determine when an attorney has in fact provided legal assistance to 
a litigant presenting himself or herself to the court as proceeding pro se. 
Additionally, courts appear reluctant to conclude that a pro se litigant 
actually has received legal assistance from an attorney without some 
affirmative confirmation from a third party that this has occurred.  For 
 
60. Bates, 745 F.2d at 1150 (holding that pro se plaintiff did not waive his appeal when he 
failed to object explicitly to the court entering judgment against him at trial when the jury‘s special 
verdicts were inconsistent). 
61. Graham, 848 F.2d at 344 (―[I]t does seem inequitable, without a more explicit warning, to 
expect an incarcerated pro se [litigant] to know that in response to the State‘s motion for summary 
judgment he cannot rely upon the papers already filed.‖); Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623–24 (stating 
that ―before dismissing a pro se civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim, the district court 
must give the plaintiff a statement of the complaint‘s deficiencies‖ and then give the pro se plaintiff 
leave to amend his or her complaint); Madyun, 657 F.2d at 877 (holding that the ―district court erred 
in granting summary judgment [against pro se plaintiff prisoners] without first alerting plaintiffs to 
the need for counter-affidavits under Rule 56(e)‖). 
62. See, e.g., Delso, 2007 WL 766349, at *13 (stating that ―in this District, courts will often 
accept Motions or briefs from pro se litigants‖ without needed supporting documentation, and that 
―[l]iberal treatment for pro se litigants has also been extended for certain time limitations, service 
requirements, pleading requirements, submission of otherwise improper sur-reply briefs, failure to 
submit a statement of uncontested facts pursuant to L.Civ.R. 56.1, and to the review given to stated 
claims‖). 
63. Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1079 (E.D. Va. 
1997). 
64. Fin. Instruments Group, Ltd. v. Leung, 30 F. App‘x 915, 916 n.1 (10th Cir. 2002). 
65. Id. 
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example, one court pronounced that ―[w]hile the practice of filing pro se 
pleadings which are actually prepared by a legal advocate does taint the legal 
process and create disparity between the parties, more than a mere supposition 
should be alleged before utilizing the inherent power of the Court to 
thoroughly prejudice a party by striking all of their pleadings.‖66  Similarly, 
another court suspicious of a pro se litigant having received assistance from 
an attorney nevertheless went on to apply ―the generous reading that is to be 
afforded to pro se pleadings—a proposition that really should not be 
applicable if the Complaint was in fact drafted by or with the assistance of a 
lawyer.‖67  This occurred notwithstanding the court‘s statement that ―[d]espite 
[the litigant‘s] nominal pro se status, it seems pretty clear that someone 
familiar with legal practice and procedure has had a major hand in drafting the 
Complaint.‖68 
Thus, a significant risk exists that courts will interpret pro se litigants‘ 
documents liberally when an attorney in fact has drafted the document 
concerned and, thus, will give unfair and unmerited assistance to the nominal 
pro se party.  Additionally, this unmerited assistance continues throughout the 
course of the lawsuit, especially at points when the opposing party is 
attempting to get the court to dismiss the nominal pro se litigant‘s legal 
claims.  Such assistance has the great potential to allow unmeritorious claims 
to remain in court well beyond the point at which a court would have 
dismissed them if the court knew that the nominal pro se party had hired 
counsel to set out his or her legal claims or arguments.  This continuation of 
unmeritorious litigation not only burdens the opposing party with more legal 
expenses, but also burdens an already overtaxed court system and unfairly 
expends the precious time and resources of the courts. 
Additionally, one court has noted that undisclosed attorney ghostwriting 
of court documents for pro se litigants ultimately may affect all pro se 
litigants negatively because such conduct may taint courts‘ views of ―well 
meaning pro se litigants who have no legal guidance at all and rely on the 
Court‘s discretionary patience in order to have a level litigating field.‖69  
 
66. Somerset Pharms. v. Kimball, 168 F.R.D. 69, 72 (M.D. Fla. 1996). 
67. Watkins v. Associated Brokers, Inc., No. 98 C 3316, 1998 WL 312124, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 
5, 1998) (citation omitted). 
68. Id.; see also Stone v. Allen, No. 07-0681-WS-M, 2007 WL 2807351, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ala. 
Sept. 25, 2007) (noting that ―[t]he level of sophistication, polish and legal research contained in 
plaintiff‘s filings strongly suggest that they were ghostwritten by counsel,‖ but failing to state that the 
court would treat the plaintiff‘s filings in any manner different from the treatment applied to 
documents filed by a litigant actually proceeding pro se); Jachnik v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 07-
cv-00263-MSK-BNB, 2007 WL 1216523, at *1 n.2 (D. Colo. Apr. 24, 2007) (construing the nominal 
pro se plaintiff‘s complaint liberally despite stating that the complaint ―appears to have been ghost-
written by an attorney‖). 
69. In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 769 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003). 
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Thus, pervasive uncertainty about whether litigants presenting themselves as 
pro se are in fact receiving the aid of an attorney might eventually cause 
courts to be very reluctant to provide additional assistance to litigants who in 
fact are proceeding completely in a pro se capacity. 
Attorney ghostwriting of pro se litigants‘ court documents also can be 
unfair in that it can allow attorneys to cast aspersions on opposing counsel, or 
even the opposing party, without accountability.  One court has decried that 
attorney ghostwriting of a pro se litigant‘s court documents ―enables an 
attorney to launch an attack, even against another member of the Bar . . . 
without showing his [or her] face,‖ which ―smacks of the gross unfairness that 
characterizes hit-and-run tactics.‖70  While that case concerned a repetitive 
plaintiff who had filed a vexatious lawsuit against a law firm, among other 
parties,
71
 attorney ghostwriting of court documents could give rise to attacks 
on the integrity or conduct of opposing counsel for which the undisclosed 
counsel would not have to answer even in meritorious cases.  Therefore, 
ghostwriting of court documents has the potential to increase incivility 
between parties to litigation and to decrease professionalism between 
attorneys who are in fact representing opposing parties. 
Finally, ghostwriting can be particularly unfair to the opposing side when 
the opposing side actually is proceeding pro se and is unaware that the other 
nominal pro se party in fact is receiving assistance from legal counsel in the 
litigation.  In this scenario, the party who in fact is proceeding pro se is 
deprived of material information about the legal assistance to which the 
nominal pro se party has access.  If privy to this information, the opposing 
party might change his or her mind about proceeding pro se and go ahead and 
hire an attorney.
72
  Thus, not having this information could put the opposing 
party at a severe disadvantage. 
 
70. Klein v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 309 F. Supp. 341, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see also Delso v. 
Trs. for Ret. Plan for Hourly Employees of Merck & Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, at *15 
(D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007) (―One of the earliest cases regarding ghostwriting laid its concern in the 
enabling of ‗an attorney to launch an attack against another member of the Bar . . . without showing 
his face.‘‖) (quoting Klein, 309 F. Supp. at 343); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. at 768 (―An obvious result 
of the anonymity afforded ghost-writing attorneys is that they cannot be policed pursuant to the 
applicable ethical, professional, and substantive rules enforced by the Court and members of the bar 
since no other party to the existing litigation is aware of the ghost-writing attorney‘s existence.‖). 
71. Klein, 309 F. Supp. at 342. 
72. See CAL. COMM‘N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, REPORT ON LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL 
ASSISTANCE WITH INITIAL RECOMMENDATIONS app. at 41 (2003) (―There should be a level playing 
field for [the] opposing party in an unbundled situation.  If one side had known the other side had an 
attorney, instead of learning of it when, all of a sudden, an attorney appeared at a court hearing, they 
might have brought one too.‖); see also infra Part V (discussing hypothetical ―stealth‖ representation 
by attorney of nominal pro se litigant through the course of litigation, including during settlement 
negotiations). 
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2.  Ghostwriting Violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 
The second major rationale that courts have used to conclude that 
undisclosed attorney ghostwriting of court documents is unethical is that this 
conduct violates the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.  
Courts have reasoned that by failing to sign documents that the attorney has 
drafted for the nominal pro se litigant, the attorney improperly avoids his or 
her duty to certify that a reasonable basis exists for both the facts and legal 
arguments presented in the document.
73
  This could leave a court without 
anyone to sanction should it conclude that the document concerned is ―legally 
or factually frivolous‖ because the rule prohibits ―the imposition of monetary 
sanctions against a represented party for filing legally frivolous claims.‖74  In 
fact, whether certain conduct is sanctionable in the first place may depend on 
whether counsel or a party engaged in it because ―certain conduct may be 
sanctionable if committed by counsel but not if committed by a party.‖75  
Furthermore, ―[a court] could encounter legal and factual obstacles if it 
attempted to impose sanctions‖ due to a violation of Rule 11 on the attorney 
 
73. Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1271–72 (10th Cir. 2001) (―Mr. Snow‘s actions in 
providing substantial legal assistance to Mr. Duran without entering an appearance in this case . . . 
inappropriately shields Mr. Snow from responsibility and accountability for his actions and counsel,‖ 
in part, because the attorney avoided his obligations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.); Ellis 
v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir. 1971) (―What we fear is that in some cases actual members 
of the bar represent petitioners, informally or otherwise, and prepare briefs for them which the 
assisting lawyers do not sign, and thus escape the obligation imposed on members of the bar, typified 
by F.R.Civ.P. 11, but which exist in all cases, criminal as well as civil, of representing to the court 
that there is good ground to support the assertions made.‖); Delso, 2007 WL 766349, at *17 (―By 
failing to affirmatively advise the Court of his assistance of Delso, and by permitting Delso to submit 
ghostwritten briefing to the Court under her own name, Shapiro failed to certify documentation that 
he prepared that was submitted to the Court and violated the spirit of [Rule 11].‖); Wesley v. Don 
Stein Buick, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 884, 886 (D. Kan. 1997) (―[G]host-writing has been condemned as a 
deliberate evasion of the responsibilities imposed on counsel by Rule 11, Fed.R.Civ.P.‖); Laremont-
Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (E.D. Va. 1997) (finding that 
attorney ghostwriting of pro se litigant‘s court documents ―undermines the purpose of the signature 
certification requirement‖); Clarke v. United States, 955 F. Supp. 593, 598 (E.D. Va. 1997) (―Ghost-
writing by an attorney of a ‗pro se‘ plaintiff‘s pleadings has been condemned as both unethical and a 
deliberate evasion of the responsibilities imposed on attorneys by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
11.‖), vacated, 1998 WL 559754 (4th Cir. Sept. 2, 1998); Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm‘rs, 868 F. 
Supp. 1226, 1231 (D. Colo. 1994) (―[G]host-writing has been condemned as a deliberate evasion of 
the responsibilities imposed on counsel by Rule 11, F.R.Civ.P.‖); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. at 768 
(―Ghost-writing frustrates the application of these rules [concerning attorney certification through 
signature of court documents] by shielding the attorney who drafted pleadings for pro se litigants in a 
cloak of anonymity.‖); see also supra Part III.C (discussing the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11(b)). 
74. Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1079; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(5)(A) (stating that 
―[t]he court must not impose a monetary sanction: (A) against a represented party for violating Rule 
11(b)(2)‖). 
75. United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 966 F. Supp. 361, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
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who actually drafted the document concerned because the identity of the 
actual drafter is unknown.
76
 
3.  Ghostwriting Frustrates Efficient Court Administration 
The third rationale that some courts have used to support the decision to 
prohibit attorney ghostwriting of court documents is that such conduct 
frustrates a court‘s efficient administration of its case docket.  For example, 
even if the court is able to discover the identity of the attorney responsible for 
drafting a deficient document, such an investigation causes the court to have 
to expend time and resources that would have been unnecessary had the 
attorney originally disclosed his or her identity and the assistance provided to 
the litigant on the document.
77
  One bankruptcy court has noted why 
knowledge of the identity of the person who drafted court documents is 
particularly important to the timely administration and discharge of a 
bankruptcy case.  The court explained that ―it may be more important that . . . 
attorneys who limit their representation sign the [initial bankruptcy] petition 
precisely because they will not be representing the debtor throughout the 
case‖ and because it is fairly common for documents filed in bankruptcy court 
to contain errors and omissions, which attorneys routinely correct by 
amending those documents.
78
  However, if the attorney drafts the initial 
bankruptcy petition and then is not involved any further in the case, ―he or she 
may have no notice of the need for amendment,‖ and the client may not 
recognize the need to make amendments.
79
  Thus, ―[d]isclosure of the 
preparer‘s identity allows the U.S. Trustee, interim trustee or creditor to 
obtain clarifying or correcting disclosures.‖80 
Another bankruptcy court has recognized that attorney ghostwriting of 
documents hinders its ability to rule on emergency motions and conduct 
emergency hearings.  The court stated that it ―has a high volume of cases—
many, if not all, involve time-sensitive matters that require the Court to hear 
matters and issue rulings in an expeditious manner.‖81  ―An integral part‖ of 
the procedures that the court has developed to address such situations include 
―the need for the filing party to correctly serve the motion and notice of the 
hearing in an expedited fashion and be immediately prepared to present 
 
76. Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1079; see also Eleven Vehicles, 966 F. Supp. at 367 
(―[G]host writing arrangements interfere with the Court‘s ability to superintend the conduct of 
counsel and parties during the litigation.‖). 
77. Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1079. 
78. In re Merriam, 250 B.R. 724, 734 n.12 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 770 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003). 
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evidence justifying the relief sought.‖82  It is difficult for this to occur if the 
opposing party indicates it is proceeding pro se, but in fact is unknowingly 
represented by counsel who should receive notice of such proceedings instead 
of the client.
83
 
Even if the opposing party somehow is aware that an attorney is assisting 
the nominal pro se party, that party will be unaware of the extent of the 
representation and whether the representation ended with the drafting of the 
initial court documents or extended to dealing with subsequent motions and 
hearings.  These deleterious effects in bankruptcy proceedings are particularly 
relevant to the issue of attorney ghostwriting of documents because 
bankruptcy is an area where parties often choose to represent themselves;
84
 
the provision of unbundled legal services thus would be useful, and the 
problem of ghostwritten court documents is likely to be prevalent.  
Nevertheless, these efficiency concerns are not peculiar to bankruptcy cases.  
In order for any lawsuit to proceed efficiently, the court and opposing party 
need to know to whom to communicate—either the party or an attorney acting 
on behalf of the party—throughout the litigation. 
4.  Ghostwriting Violates Court Appearance Rules 
The fourth policy rationale for prohibiting attorney ghostwriting of court 
documents is related to this efficiency concern.  Courts have stated that 
ghostwriting of documents for nominal pro se litigants violates court rules 
governing when attorneys make an appearance before a court.
85
  One court 
recognized that ghostwriting of court documents allowed attorneys to 
circumvent its local rule governing when an attorney makes an appearance 
because by failing to disclose his or her identity and the services provided to 
the nominal pro se litigant, the attorney avoided appearing in the court.
86
  
Customarily, an attorney makes an appearance in a court ―by signing and 
 
82. Id. 
83. The court in this specific case presented a slightly different point, stating that ―[p]ro se 
litigants frequently have difficulty meeting these requirements . . . thus taxing the Court‘s system and 
forcing the Court to expend more time and effort to handle the matter,‖ and thus the ―Court must be 
able to look to attorneys of record to perform these tasks for the benefit of their clients and case 
administration.‖  Id.  However, this is a rationale for discouraging parties from participating pro se in 
bankruptcy proceedings rather than for requiring them to disclose that they are in fact represented by 
counsel instead of continuing to proceed under nominal pro se status. 
84. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
85. Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1079 (E.D. Va. 
1997) (―[T]he practice of ghost-writing pleadings or motions for otherwise pro se litigants allows 
attorneys to circumvent [a local rule governing entry of an appearance and withdrawal of 
representation].‖); see also In re Merriam, 250 B.R. at 734 (―[The attorney who prepared a 
bankruptcy petition] chose not to sign the petition because he did not want to enter a general 
appearance in this bankruptcy case by customary practice of signing and filing a pleading.‖). 
86. Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1079. 
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filing a pleading.‖87  If an attorney ―has entered an appearance in a civil or 
criminal action, withdrawal is permitted only by order of the court, and after 
reasonable notice to the party represented.‖88  Moreover, the purpose of the 
rule governing how an attorney makes an appearance is ―to provide for 
communication between the litigants and the court, as well as ensuring that 
the court is able to fairly and efficiently administer the litigation.‖89  The four 
policy rationales discussed above have led courts to conclude that attorney 
ghostwriting is prohibited and to resoundingly condemn this activity. 
B.  The “Mixed Bag” of Approaches by the American Bar Association and 
State and Local Ethics Panels 
Ethics opinions addressing attorney ghostwriting of court documents for 
nominal pro se litigants have not spoken with the near unanimity that courts 
have.  In fact, the ABA recently changed its position on this activity, 
concluding that ethics rules do not prohibit it.
90
  However, the majority of 
opinions from state and local ethics committees require attorneys to disclose 
in some manner to the court and opposing counsel when they have drafted 
court documents for an otherwise pro se litigant.
91
  In contrast, a small number 
of state and local ethics opinions have concluded that ghostwriting attorneys 
do not have to disclose this conduct,
92
 and some commentators continue to 
argue against requiring disclosure of attorney ghostwriting.
93
 
1.  The Old ABA Stance Prohibiting Attorney Ghostwriting 
In 1978, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
addressed the appropriateness under the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility of an attorney ghostwriting pleadings and providing other legal 
 
87. In re Merriam, 250 B.R. at 734 n.14.  However, ―[t]he manner of entering an appearance is 
regulated by local rule.‖  Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2000) (entitled ―Appearance personally or 
by counsel‖ and stating that ―the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by 
counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes 
therein‖).  As of 1988, seventy-three federal districts out of ninety-four had a local rule dealing with 
the appearance and withdrawal of counsel.  12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & 
RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3154 n.12 (2d ed. 1997) (citing 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Local 
Rules Project app. A (1988)). 
88. Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1079; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 
1.16(c) (2002) (stating that a ―lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or 
permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation‖ and that ―[w]hen ordered to do so . . . , a 
lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation‖).  
89. Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1079. 
90. See infra Part IV.B.1–2. 
91. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
92. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
93. See infra Part IV.C. 
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services to a nominal pro se litigant without disclosure to the court or 
opposing counsel.
94
  The opinion specifically dealt with an attorney ―who 
assisted a ‗pro se‘ litigant in preparing jury instructions, memoranda of 
authorities and other documents submitted to the Court.‖95  At one point, the 
attorney ―involved also ‗sat in on‘ the [nominal pro se client‘s] trial.‖96  
Apparently, before this occurred, ―neither the Court nor the lawyer(s) for the 
other party or parties knew of the lawyer‘s previous participation on behalf of 
the litigant or the extent of [this participation.]‖97 
The committee began its analysis by finding that the nominal pro se 
litigant had ―engaged in a misrepresentation (perhaps unwitting) by professing 
to be without representation . . . when, in truth, he was receiving active and 
rather extensive assistance of undisclosed counsel.‖98  The committee went on 
to find that the attorney‘s conduct was unethical because the attorney was 
―involved in the litigant‘s misrepresentation‖ and such conduct violated 
Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4) of the Model Code, which prohibited attorneys 
from engaging ―‗in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, or 
misrepresentation.‘‖99 
However, the opinion did not indicate exactly how or to what extent the 
attorney should have disclosed his assistance to the nominal pro se client.  In 
other words, the opinion did not state whether the attorney should have just 
indicated on the documents drafted for his client that the client was receiving 
legal assistance from an attorney generally or whether the attorney should 
have disclosed his identity on such documents.  This opinion also did not 
indicate how extensively an attorney needed to assist a pro se litigant before 
he or she must disclose the fact of this aid to a court.  In fact, the opinion 
seemed to suggest that not all legal assistance provided to pro se litigants 
would need to be disclosed: ―We do not intend to suggest that a lawyer may 
never give advice to a litigant who is otherwise proceeding pro se, or that a 
lawyer could not, for example, prepare or assist in the preparation of a 
pleading for a litigant who is otherwise acting pro se.‖100  The committee 
noted that ―the determination of the propriety of such a lawyer‘s actions will 
 
94. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1414 (1978). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. (quoting the MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4) as stating: ―‗A 
lawyer shall not: . . . (4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation.‘‖).  Model Rule 8.4(c) is the closest corollary to DR 1-102(A)(4) in the current 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the 
relevant language from Model Rule 8.4(c) potentially applicable to attorney ghostwriting).  
100. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1414 (1978). 
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depend on the particular facts involved.‖101  ―Extensive undisclosed 
participation by a lawyer, however, that permits the litigant falsely to appear 
without substantial professional assistance is improper . . . .‖102 
2.  The New ABA Position Allowing Attorney Ghostwriting 
The ABA, though, in a recent, superseding opinion changed its position 
on attorney ghostwriting.
103
  In May 2007, the ABA‘s Standing Committee on 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued a formal opinion in which it 
concluded that attorney ghostwriting of documents for litigants holding 
themselves out to the court as pro se is appropriate under the Model Rules of 
Professional Responsibility without disclosure.
104
  The committee‘s main 
rationale for this conclusion was that a court will not disadvantage the 
opposing party by applying a more liberal interpretation to ghostwritten 
documents.
105
  This results because a court will be able to tell when an 
attorney has provided such assistance, and if the court cannot detect this, then 
the attorney did not help the nominal pro se party enough to disadvantage the 
other party.
106
  Therefore, ―[b]ecause there is no reasonable concern that a 
litigant appearing pro se will receive an unfair benefit from a tribunal as a 
result of behind-the-scenes legal assistance, the nature or extent of such 
assistance is immaterial and need not be disclosed.‖107 
The committee further concluded that attorneys who ghostwrite 
documents do not ―circumvent[] court rules requiring the assumption of 
responsibility for their pleadings,‖ such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
11.
108
  The committee reasoned that because the attorney never actually signs 
the documents and, thus, does not ―make[] an affirmative statement to the 
tribunal concerning the matter,‖ this conduct never triggers duties set out in 
Rule 11.
109
 
Similarly, the committee concluded that attorney ghostwriting of 
documents did not involve dishonest conduct, which Model Rule 8.4(c) 
prohibits, because the ―lawyer is making no statement at all to the forum 
 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-446 (2007). 
104. Id.  The committee examined the appropriateness of attorney ghostwriting under Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2(d), 3.3(b), 4.1(b), and 8.4(c).  Id.; see also supra Part III.A–B 
(discussing the language from these rules potentially applicable to attorney ghostwriting). 
105. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-446 (2007). 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
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regarding the nature or scope of the representation.‖110  ―Absent an affirmative 
statement by the client, that can be attributed to the lawyer, that the 
documents were prepared without legal assistance, the lawyer has not been 
dishonest within the meaning of Rule 8.4(c).‖111  Therefore, according to the 
committee, an attorney does not mislead a court by ghostwriting documents 
for a nominal pro se litigant. 
The committee acknowledged its earlier opinion applying the Model Code 
of Professional Responsibility to ghostwriting and characterized that opinion 
as ―stating that disclosure of at least the fact of legal assistance must be made 
to avoid misleading the court and other parties, but that the lawyer providing 
the assistance need not be identified.‖112  However, as set out above, the 
earlier opinion did not address at all the type of disclosure necessary, whether 
just the fact of assistance or the actual identity of the attorney involved.
113
 
3.  State and Local Ethics Panels 
State and local ethics panels are all over the proverbial board on this issue.  
The overwhelming majority of ethics panels to have addressed the matter 
have concluded that an attorney must disclose his or her drafting of court 
documents for a nominal pro se litigant.
114
  However, these ethics opinions 
have disagreed about the extent of the disclosure that must be made.  Some 
ethics opinions have concluded that the identity of the attorney who provided 
the legal assistance must be disclosed in some manner,
115
 while others have 
determined that only the fact of the legal assistance, and not the attorney‘s 
identity, needs to be disclosed.
116
  Moreover, the ethics panels in the 
jurisdictions that require some type of disclosure do not agree on how 
substantial the legal assistance has to be in order to trigger this duty.  Some 
consider any preparation of pleadings beyond an attorney helping a client fill 
out a standard form to be significant enough to require disclosure
117
 while 
others have concluded that more substantial assistance needs to occur to 
 
110. Id.  The committee went on to suggest that disclosure might even violate an attorney‘s 
duty of confidentiality to the nominal pro se client under Model Rule 1.6 and an attorney‘s duty to 
―abide by a client‘s decisions concerning the objectives of [the] representation‖ under Model Rule 
1.2(a).  Id. at nn.10–11; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2003); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a), (c) (2002).  This Article addresses the confidentiality 
argument, infra Part IV.C. 
111. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-446 (2007). 
112. Id. 
113. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1414 (1978); see also 
supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the ABA‘s earlier opinion on attorney ghostwriting). 
114. See infra Part IV.B.3.a–b. 
115. See infra Part IV.B.3.a. 
116. See infra Part IV.B.3.b. 
117. See infra notes 124, 141–42 and accompanying text. 
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trigger the attorney‘s duty to disclose.118  Finally, a small number of ethics 
panels have concluded that a ghostwriting attorney simply does not have a 
duty to disclose to anyone even the fact of his or her having provided legal 
assistance to a nominal pro se litigant no matter how substantial the legal 
assistance given.
119
 
a.  Opinions Requiring Disclosure of Fact of Ghostwriting and the Identity of 
the Ghostwriting Attorney 
Several state and local ethics committees have concluded that an attorney 
who provides legal assistance to nominal pro se litigants must disclose his or 
her identity as well as the fact of having provided such assistance.  For 
example, the New York State Bar Association Committee on Professional 
Ethics concluded this when it addressed the issue of attorney ghostwriting of 
the pleadings of a pro se litigant.
120
  The committee endorsed the plan of the 
inquirer who proposed sending along with the pleadings to counsel for the 
opposing party a cover letter stating that the client was submitting the 
pleadings concerned ―on a pro se basis‖ and that the attorney‘s representation 
of the client was limited to the drafting of these pleadings and providing the 
client with the cover letter.
121
  The committee acknowledged that ―the pro 
bono ‗efforts of individual lawyers,‘ together with the availability of legal 
services offices, ‗are often not enough to meet the need‘ of the indigent.‖122  
Nevertheless, the committee concluded that just indicating the fact that the 
nominal pro se litigant had received some legal assistance without revealing 
the identity of the attorney who had provided such assistance was 
―insufficient to fulfill the purposes of the disclosure requirement.‖123  The 
committee expressly determined that ―the preparation of a pleading, even a 
simple one, for a pro se litigant constitutes ‗active and substantial‘ aid 
requiring disclosure of the lawyer‘s participation.‖124 
The Kentucky Bar Association‘s ethics panel came to a similar 
conclusion, finding that ―counsel‘s name should appear somewhere on the 
pleading, although counsel is limiting his or her assistance to the preparation 
 
118. See infra notes 136–38 and accompanying text. 
119. See infra Part IV.B.3.c. 
120. N.Y. State Bar Ass‘n Comm. on Prof‘l Ethics, Op. 613 (1990). 
121. Id.  The inquirer was ―the managing attorney of a legal services office in an upstate rural 
county who [had] been unable to obtain attorneys within the county to undertake pro bono 
representation of indigent persons served with a summons and complaint in divorce actions.‖  Id. 
122. Id. (quoting the version of N.Y. Code of Professional Responsibility EC 2-25 in effect in 
1990).  The committee went on to state that it ―firmly believe[d] that the creation of barriers to the 
procurement of legal advice by those in need and who are unable to pay in the name of legal ethics ill 
serves the profession.‖  Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
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of the pleading.‖125  It agreed with opinions from other states that found ―that 
the preparation of a pleading, other than a previously prepared form devised 
specifically for use by pro se litigants, constitute[d] substantial assistance that 
must be disclosed to the Court and the adversary.‖126  The opinion recognized, 
on the other hand, that ―the opponent cannot reasonably demand‖ that the 
court compel ―counsel providing such limited assistance . . . to enter an 
appearance for all purposes.‖127  ―A contrary view would place a higher value 
on tactical maneuvering than on the obligation to provide assistance to 
indigent litigants.‖128  However, the opinion stated that ―[t]he inclusion of 
forms for use by pro se litigants in a handbook intended for distribution to 
laymen has not been viewed as the practice of law or as active and substantial 
assistance implicating any of the above considerations.‖129 
An opinion from the Delaware State Bar Association Committee on 
Professional Ethics provides another example of an ethics committee that 
concluded that ―it is improper for an attorney to fail to disclose the fact that he 
or she has provided significant assistance to a litigant.‖130  The committee 
concluded that failing to disclose conduct constituting ―significant assistance‖ 
to a nominal pro se litigant ―misleads the court and opposing counsel in 
violation of Rule 8.4(c).‖131  The committee reasoned that a litigant who 
received limited legal services from an attorney but proceeded pro se in the 
litigation ―may receive some advantage, in the form of more lenient treatment 
concerning procedural matters, for example, if the tribunal perceives the 
 
125. Ky. Bar Ass‘n, Ethics Op. E-343 (1991).  The inquiry to the committee came also from a 
legal services organization that could not ―satisfy all requests for assistance, and [could not] always 
obtain alternative (volunteer) pro bono counsel.‖  Id.  However, the court noted that its ―answer 
would also apply to limited representation provided by lawyers in private practice.‖  Id. 
126. Id.  The opinion went on to state that an attorney, though, ―should not hold forth that his or 
her representation was limited, and that the litigant is unrepresented, and yet continue to provide 
behind the scenes representation.‖  Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Del. State Bar Ass‘n Comm. on Prof‘l Ethics, Op. 1994-2 (1994).  Once again, the inquiry 
to the committee came from the director of a legal services organization who, ―[b]ecause of staffing 
limitations and other reasons,‖ had staff attorneys who ―sometimes agree[d] to provide services on a 
limited basis‖ to litigants often who had cases ―in Family Court or Justice of the Peace Court, which 
use forms for most pleadings.‖  Id.  The opinion went on to state that: 
 
If the litigant‘s case [was] in the Court of Common Pleas or [was] an appeal to 
Superior Court, as in unemployment compensation cases, the litigant may be 
advised as to how to answer the complaint or file an appeal, or the staff 
attorneys may prepare the answer or appeal for the litigant‘s signature.  The 
litigants are also advised how to file and serve the completed documents. 
Id. 
131. Id. 
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litigant to be unrepresented.‖132  The committee emphasized that the 
―seriousness of the ethical problem increases in proportion to the extent to 
which services are provided.‖133 
Moreover, the committee recommended, similar to the New York State 
Bar Association committee, that the attorney make the required disclosure 
through ―a letter to the court and opposing counsel, indicating the limited 
extent of the representation.‖134  The committee indicated that such an 
attorney, though, should not ―sign pleadings, motions or other papers where 
the attorney and client have agreed that the attorney will not be representing 
the client in litigation‖ because ―[t]he attorney‘s signature in such a case 
would misleadingly indicate that the attorney would be representing the client 
in the litigation.‖135 
However, contrary to the ethics opinions from the New York and 
Kentucky state bar associations, the Delaware ethics committee concluded 
that in order to constitute ―significant assistance,‖ an attorney‘s assistance 
must go ―further than merely helping a litigant to fill out an initial pleading, 
and/or providing initial general advice and information.‖136  Only ―[i]f an 
attorney drafts court papers (other than an initial pleading) on the client‘s 
behalf‖ or provides legal assistance that ―is on-going‖ would the attorney 
need to disclose the provision of such legal services.
137
  The committee 
apparently wanted to allow the legal services organization that made the 
initial inquiry to be able to continue helping nominal pro se litigants in family 
law and worker‘s compensation matters to fill out their initial pleadings 
without disclosing that this assistance had occurred.
138
 
 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id.  Although not explicitly stated in the opinion, the Delaware ethics opinion appeared to 
require that an attorney who provided ―significant assistance‖ to a nominal pro se litigant disclose his 
or her identity in addition to the fact of having provided such legal assistance because the committee 
explicitly stated that it ―agree[d] with the New York State Bar Association ethics committee in 
concluding that disclosure of this assistance by means of a letter to the court and opposing counsel, 
indicating the limited extent of the representation, is required,‖ id., and as set out above, the New 
York State Bar Association‘s ethics opinion required that a ghostwriting attorney disclose his or her 
identity.  See supra notes 120–24 and accompanying text. 
135. Del. State Bar Ass‘n Comm. on Prof‘l Ethics, Op. 1994-2 (1994). 
136. Id. 
137. Id.  However, the committee did caution that ―whether the pleadings are signed by a pro 
se litigant or by a staff attorney, the attorney should not participate in the preparation of pleadings 
without satisfying himself or herself that the pleading is not frivolous or interposed for an improper 
purpose.‖  Id. 
138. See id. 
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b.  Opinions Requiring Disclosure of Fact of Ghostwriting but Not the Identity 
of the Ghostwriting Attorney 
The ethics panels of some other state and local bar associations have 
concluded that an attorney who provides limited legal services to a nominal 
pro se litigant need only disclose the fact of the assistance and not his or her 
identity.  For example, the New York City Bar Association‘s ethics committee 
concluded that ―what must be disclosed is the fact that the litigant appearing 
pro se is receiving legal assistance, not the identity of the person rendering 
such assistance.‖139  The committee suggested that this could be indicated by 
including ―Prepared by Counsel‖ on the pleadings concerned.140 
However, the committee departed with the analysis of some other 
jurisdictions‘ ethics panels with regard to the level of legal assistance that 
would trigger this duty to disclose.  The committee found an attorney had to 
make such a disclosure when he or she had rendered ―active and substantial 
assistance‖ to a nominal pro se litigant.141  ―[D]rafting any pleadings falls into 
that category, except where no more is involved than assisting a litigant to fill 
out a previously prepared form devised particularly for use by pro se 
litigants.‖142 
In concluding that it was unethical for an attorney to ghostwrite court 
documents for a nominal pro se litigant, the committee noted ―the special 
consideration‖ that courts afford to pro se litigants throughout a piece of 
litigation ―to compensate for their lack of legal representation‖ and found that 
the failure of a nominal pro se litigant ―to reveal that he [or she] is in fact 
receiving advice and help from an attorney may be seriously misleading.‖143  
This results because the nominal pro se litigant ―may be given deferential or 
preferential treatment to the disadvantage of his [or her] adversary.‖144  The 
committee also acknowledged that the ―court will have been burdened 
unnecessarily with the extra labor of making certain that his [or her] rights as 
a pro se litigant were fully protected.‖145  Therefore, an attorney failing to 
disclose, or to ensure that his or her client will disclose, the legal assistance 
that the pro se litigant received ―may amount to conduct involving dishonesty, 
 
139. N.Y. City Bar Ass‘n Comm. on Prof‘l & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 1987-2 (1987). 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id.  The committee went on state that ―the making available of manuals and pleading 
forms would not ordinarily be deemed ‗active and substantial legal assistance.‘‖  Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
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fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,‖ which would violate New York 
Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4).
146
 
Similarly, the Florida State Bar Association‘s Committee on Professional 
Ethics concluded that a ghostwriting attorney should disclose the fact of the 
legal assistance provided to the nominal pro se litigant by including ―Prepared 
with Assistance of Counsel‖ on the document concerned.147  One judge 
surveyed by the committee noted that not disclosing this legal assistance to 
the nominal pro se litigant would violate an attorney‘s ―duty of candor to the 
tribunal.‖148  Interestingly, in explaining its rationale for coming to this 
conclusion, the committee noted a practical consideration expressed by 
―County Court Judges who responded to an inquiry from the Committee‖ 
about an earlier opinion on the topic.
149
  These judges ―expressed concern 
about pro se litigants who appear before them having received limited 
assistance from an attorney and having little or no understanding of the 
contents of the pleadings these litigants have filed.‖150  These judges ―[a]lmost 
unanimously . . . believed that disclosure of professional legal assistance 
would prove beneficial, at least where the lawyer‘s assistance goes beyond 
helping a party fill out a simple standardized form.‖151 
c.  Opinions Concluding that Ghostwriting Can Occur Without Disclosure 
The ethics panels in a handful of state and local jurisdictions have 
concluded that attorneys ethically can ghostwrite court documents for litigants 
presenting themselves to the court as pro se without disclosing this legal 
assistance to the court or opposing counsel.  A fairly recent ethics opinion 
from the Arizona Committee on the Rules of Professional Conduct illustrated 
this viewpoint in concluding that ―disclosure to the court or tribunal of an 
 
146. Id.  At the time of this opinion, New York Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4) provided that ―a 
lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.‖  Id.  
Model Rule 8.4(c) contains a similar prohibition in the current version of the Model Rules of 
Professional Responsibility.  MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2002); see also supra 
note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the relevant language from Model Rule 8.4(c) potentially 
applicable to attorney ghostwriting). 
147. Fla. State Bar Ass‘n Comm. on Prof‘l Ethics, Op. 79-7 (Reconsideration) (2000).  In this 
opinion, the committee reconsidered its earlier opinion from 1979 in which it concluded that ―there is 
no affirmative obligation on an attorney to sign pleadings prepared by him if he is not an attorney of 
record.‖  Fla. State Bar Ass‘n Comm. on Prof‘l Ethics, Op. 79-7 (1979).  Thus, the Florida Bar has 
moved in the opposite direction of the ABA, going from allowing attorney ghostwriting to 
prohibiting it. 
148. Fla. State Bar Ass‘n Comm. on Prof‘l Ethics, Op. 79-7 (Reconsideration) (2000) (noting 
that Florida Rule 4-3.3 of Rules Regulating the Florida Bar set forth counsel‘s duty of candor to the 
tribunal). 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
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attorney‘s assistance with a court filing is not necessary when the pro per 
client submits the document for filing.‖152  Similar to the reasoning in the 
ABA‘s recent ethics opinion,153 the Arizona committee‘s main rationale for 
concluding that this conduct was ―not inherently misleading to the court or 
tribunal‖ was that ―[w]hen presented with a document prepared with 
assistance of counsel, . . . a court or tribunal can generally determine whether 
that document was written with a lawyer‘s help.‖154  Furthermore, the 
committee concluded that such conduct did not violate Arizona‘s Ethics Rule 
3.3(a)(1), which ―proscribes against an attorney making or failing to correct a 
false statement of fact or law to the court or tribunal,‖155 because it ―[did] not 
believe that the omission of an attorney‘s name from a filed document is a 
false statement of fact or law that is either made or needs to be corrected.‖156  
Accordingly, ―[b]ecause the disclosure of an attorney‘s assistance with court 
filings is not obligatory under the ethical rules,‖ an attorney did not violate 
Arizona‘s ethics rule through the acts of another when the pro per client 
submitted the documents without disclosing that he or she had received legal 
assistance in creating the document.
157
 
The Arizona committee did note that Arizona Rule 11 of Civil Procedure 
might proscribe this conduct and took pains to note that it was addressing the 
appropriateness of this conduct only ―under the [Arizona] ethical rules‖ rather 
than the ―potential applicability of Rule 11 as a matter of law.‖158  
Additionally, the committee explicitly stated that it was ―only confirm[ing] 
that the practice is not prohibited by Arizona‘s Ethical Rules‖ and that it 
 
152. Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Prof‘l Conduct, Formal Op. No. 2005-06 (2005).  
Presumably, the ethics panel used the term ―pro per‖ as short for ―in propria persona,‖ which means 
―[i]n one‘s own proper person.‖  BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th
.
 ed. 1990).  Similar to the 
ethics opinions discussed above, the inquirers were ―affiliated with an agency providing legal 
services to low- and moderate-income individuals,‖ and one of the attorneys ―practice[d] in the area 
of family law.‖  Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Prof‘l Conduct, Formal Op. No. 2005-06 (2005). 
153. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-446 (2007). 
154. Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Prof‘l Conduct, Formal Op. No. 2005-06 (2005); see also 
Ala. Bar Ass‘n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. No. 93-1 n.2 (1993) (―[T]he committee believes that 
judges are usually able to discern when a pro se litigant has received the assistance of counsel in 
preparing or drafting pleadings‖ and that therefore ―any preferential treatment otherwise afforded the 
litigant will likely be tempered, if not overlooked.‖). 
155. Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Prof‘l Conduct, Formal Op. No. 2005-06 (2005). 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Id.; see also Me. Prof‘l Ethics Comm‘n of Bd. of Overseers of Bar, Op. No. 89 (1988) 
(noting that while an attorney who drafts a complaint for an otherwise pro se client ―was not required 
to sign the complaint or otherwise enter his appearance in court as counsel for the plaintiff,‖ the 
lawyer still ―remains responsible to the client for assuring that the complaint is adequate and does not 
violate the requirements of Rule 11 of Maine Rules of Civil Procedure‖). 
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―[did] not approve of attorneys ghostwriting documents that are filed with 
courts and tribunals without providing some form of disclosure.‖159 
The Professional Responsibility and Ethics Committee for the Los 
Angeles County Bar Association also concluded that an attorney ethically 
may ghostwrite documents for a nominal pro se litigant without disclosing 
this activity to the court.
160
  The committee‘s main rationale for this 
conclusion was ―that there is no specific statute or rule which prohibits [an 
attorney] from assisting [a client] in the preparation of pleadings or other 
documents to be filed with the court, without disclosing to the court the 
attorney‘s role.‖161  Although noting in a footnote case authority from other 
jurisdictions that disapproved of this conduct,
162
 the committee stated that it 
had not found any ―published court decisions in California state or federal 
courts which have required an attorney‘s disclosure to the court regarding his 
or her involvement in preparing pleadings or documents to be filed by a 
litigant appearing in propria persona.‖163  The committee noted that ―the 
filing of ‗ghost drafted‘ pleadings or documents does not deprive a judge of 
the ability to control the proceedings before the court or to hold a party 
responsible for frivolous, misleading [conduct] or deceit in those pleadings‖ 
because the court can sanction the party proceeding pro se, rather than the 
attorney, for any such misconduct.
164
  Moreover, the court could seek to 
punish the attorney, once the attorney‘s identity was discovered, by lodging ―a 
complaint with the State Bar about the attorney‘s participation in the 
preparation of the document.‖165  Nevertheless, the committee noted that 
attorneys who ghostwrite documents for pro se litigants would have to comply 
with any rulings by a federal court that required disclosure.
166
 
The committee noted that there is ―a nationwide debate concerning the 
ethical propriety of [attorneys‘] ‗ghostwriting‘ pleadings and documents for a 
pro per litigant to file with a court.‖167  In a corresponding footnote, the 
committee noted several additional arguments for allowing attorney 
 
159. Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Prof‘l Conduct, Formal Op. No. 2005-06 (2005). 
160. Los Angeles County Bar Ass‘n Prof‘l Responsibility & Ethics Comm., Formal Op. No. 
502 (1999).  The committee dealt with a situation where a client engaged an attorney ―to give legal 
advice about the litigation and to participate in settlement negotiations,‖ and the client had filed a 
―complaint which [the] attorney drafted for her on an hourly fee basis.‖  Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at n.8. 
163. Id.  See supra note 152 for a definition of ―in propria persona.‖ 
164. Los Angeles County Bar Ass‘n Prof‘l Responsibility & Ethics Comm., Formal Op. No. 
502 (1999). 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
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ghostwriting of documents without disclosure.
168
  The committee asserted that 
―the practice promote[d] access to the courts‖ and was ―likely to improve the 
quality of the pro per pleadings,‖ which would result ―in increased judicial 
efficiency and fairness to the parties.‖169  Furthermore, ―the practice would 
support the client‘s right to control the extent of an attorney‘s involvement‖ in 
the representation.
170
  However, the committee did not explain exactly how 
requiring disclosure of the attorney‘s assistance would prevent a party from 
entering into a limited scope representation agreement with an attorney.  In 
the same footnote, though, the committee did note that ―[s]ome opinions 
observe that the attorney deceives, defrauds, misrepresents to, or lacks candor 
with the court by anonymously assisting the pro per litigant.‖171  Despite 
noting these arguments for requiring attorney disclosure, the committee did 
not counter them or address them any further.
172
 
Additionally, an ethics opinion from the Utah State Bar determined that it 
was not improper ―for an attorney to prepare or assist in the preparation of 
pleadings‖ without disclosing this to the court.173  However, the opinion noted 
that ―when the attorney gives any additional assistance and the litigant 
continues to inform the court that he [or she] is proceeding pro se, [the 
litigant] has engaged in [a] misrepresentation by professing to be without 
representation.‖174   
Therefore, the general ethical prohibition against an attorney engaging in 
―conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation‖ seemingly 
would require the attorney to disclose any assistance beyond preparation of 
pleadings.
175
  The committee did not elaborate much further on its reasons for 
drawing this distinction other than stating that ―[t]he extent of an attorney‘s 
participation on behalf of the litigant who appears to the court and other 
counsel as being without professional representation is the determining 
factor‖ as to whether disclosure is required.176  The opinion concluded by 
stating that ―extensive undisclosed participation by an attorney that permits 
the litigant falsely to appear as being without substantial professional 
 
168. Id. at n.8. 
169. Id. 
170. Id.  The committee also noted that California law allowed ―legal documents assistants and 
unlawful detainer assistants to assist in the preparation and filing of documents under certain 
circumstances, without making disclosure to courts‖ and that requiring attorneys ―to make 
disclosures to courts‖ might involve ―an uneven application of law.‖  Id. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. No. 74 (1981). 
174. Id. 
175. Id. (quoting UTAH DISCIPLINARY RULE 1-102(A)(4)). 
176. Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. No. 74 (1981). 
134 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [92:103 
assistance is improper.‖177  Therefore, the ethics opinions that conclude that 
attorneys do not have to disclose ghostwriting tend to do so on the narrow 
ground that the language of the applicable ethics rules does not expressly 
prohibit such conduct, and at least one opinion would still require disclosure 
to the court and opposing counsel if the attorney provides any legal assistance 
beyond just drafting a pleading. 
C.  Arguments by Ghostwriting Proponents for Allowing Attorney 
Ghostwriting Without Disclosure 
Commentators who promote allowing ghostwriting of court documents for 
nominal pro se litigants without disclosure have put forth several arguments.  
For example, one commentator primarily asserts that courts can detect when 
an attorney, as opposed to the litigant, has drafted documents.
178
  Some of the 
ethics opinions allowing attorney ghostwriting without disclosure noted above 
have adopted this rationale.
179
 
However, proponents of permitting attorney ghostwriting of documents 
have put forth additional arguments not necessarily emphasized by ethics 
opinions.  The first, and most compelling, argument is that requiring 
disclosure when an attorney drafts court documents for an otherwise pro se 
litigant will act as a disincentive to attorneys providing limited legal 
services.
180
  This will result because attorneys will be afraid that courts, once 
they discover the attorney‘s representation of the client, will interpret the 
attorney‘s having drafted pleadings to be the equivalent of entering a general 
appearance in the court involved.
181
 
 
177. Id. 
178. See Goldschmidt, supra note 25, at 1157 (―Practically speaking, however, ghostwriting is 
obvious from the face of the legal papers filed . . . .  [W]here the court sees the higher quality of the 
pleadings, there is no reason to apply any liberality in construction . . . .‖). 
179. See supra notes 106 and 154 and accompanying text. 
180. See Klempner, supra note 5, at 671 (―Most studies have indicated that requiring disclosure 
of the name and address of the attorney [who has performed unbundled drafting of legal documents] 
serves as a deterrent to lawyers offering unbundled legal services.‖). 
181. See Alicia M. Farley, An Important Piece of the Bundle: How Limited Appearances Can 
Provide an Ethically Sound Way to Increase Access to Justice for Pro Se Litigants, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 563, 570 (2007) (―Attorneys are often cautious about arguing before a court on a limited 
matter due to uncertainty that courts will abide by the limitation contained in the retainer agreement 
and allow the attorney to withdraw upon completion of the agreed-upon task.‖); Goldschmidt, supra 
note 25, at 1165, 1189–90 (raising the question of ―whether an attorney subject to the candor-to-the-
tribunal duties can then be compelled to enter an appearance and involuntarily provide legal services 
beyond those provided for in the scope-of-the-representation agreement‖ and noting that ―[p]rivate 
attorneys who engage in ghostwriting ‗revealed that they would be much less willing to provide this 
service if they had to put their names on the pleadings‘‖); Rothermich, supra note 5, at 2725 (―If the 
practice of ghostwriting itself constitutes an appearance as attorney of record . . . [, a]n attorney could 
never agree to provide only drafting assistance and preliminary advice because she could always be 
forced to appear in court and fully represent the pro se litigant as counsel of record.‖).  For example, 
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As stated above, attorneys generally enter an appearance by signing the 
initial pleading filed on behalf of their client.
182
  A court could conclude that 
an attorney‘s disclosure on such a pleading that the attorney assisted the client 
in or drafted the pleading for the client, even if the attorney had not signed the 
pleading, constitutes a general appearance.  Once an attorney enters an 
appearance in the case, the attorney will need the court‘s consent to end the 
representation, even if the representation was supposed to end with the 
drafting of the pleading concerned.
183
  Thus, the attorney‘s representation of 
the client may not be limited in the manner initially contemplated by the 
attorney and client when entering into the representation.
184
  This could cause 
attorneys to refrain from entering into discrete task representations because of 
a fear that a court ultimately will require that they provide the full array of 
legal services to the client concerned. 
However, the more familiar that courts become with attorneys providing 
unbundled legal services to clients, the less likely it seems that they would 
require attorneys who have agreed to provide such services to engage in a 
full-blown representation of the client concerned.  If courts want pro se 
litigants to receive some legal advice in order to increase the efficiency in 
which the court can adjudicate their cases, courts should allow attorneys to 
provide discrete legal services to litigants without being ―on the hook‖ for 
representing the client throughout the entire case.
185
  In fact, the more that 
courts deal with this type of legal services arrangement, the more likely that 
 
―a lawyer may be unable to represent a victim of domestic violence in an effort to secure a temporary 
restraining order because the [court‘s] policies would require the lawyer to make a motion to 
withdraw, and perhaps show good cause, to be excused from all other parts of the legal dispute.‖  
ABA HEARING REPORT, supra note 5, at 6. 
182. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
183. See Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1079 (E.D. 
Va. 1997) (―[O]nce an attorney has entered an appearance in a civil or criminal action, withdrawal is 
permitted only by order of the court, and after reasonable notice to the party represented.‖); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16(c) (2002) (stating that a ―lawyer must comply with applicable 
law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation‖ and that 
―[w]hen ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good 
cause for terminating the representation.‖); see also Farley, supra note 181, at 570 (―In many 
jurisdictions, attorneys must obtain permission from the court before withdrawing from a case.‖).  
184. See Goldschmidt, supra note 25, at 1165 (―This raises the question of whether an attorney 
subject to the candor-to-the-tribunal duties can then be compelled to enter an appearance and 
involuntarily provide legal services beyond those provided for in the scope-of-the-representation 
agreement.‖); Rothermich, supra note 5, at 2725 (―If the practice of ghostwriting itself constitutes an 
appearance as attorney of record simply because it engenders an attorney-client relationship, [the 
contemplated limited representation] would be rendered impossible by definition.‖). 
185. See Farley, supra note 181, at 571 (―Proponents of limited appearances argue it is more 
efficient for the court and fair for litigants to have attorneys actually argue on behalf of low-income, 
unrepresented litigants in court proceedings.‖). 
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they will develop special procedural rules to accommodate such legal 
representations.
186
 
The second argument that some commentators have presented is that an 
attorney‘s disclosure of the legal services that the attorney has provided to the 
nominal pro se litigant would violate the attorney‘s duty of confidentiality to 
the client and the attorney-client privilege.
187
  While an attorney‘s duty of 
confidentiality might encompass the fact of his or her representation of a 
client if a client did not wish to have this revealed,
188
 generally an attorney has 
the option of disclosing confidential information if disclosure is necessary to 
prevent a fraud and the client has used the attorney‘s services in furtherance 
of the fraud.
189
  Assuming that courts cannot easily discern exactly when 
attorneys have drafted documents for pro se litigants, which the language of 
several court opinions indicates,
190
 an attorney can disclose the fact of his or 
her having provided legal services to the nominal pro se litigant in order to 
prevent the other party from being disadvantaged by the court inappropriately 
applying a liberal interpretation to the court documents concerned and being 
more forgiving in the nominal pro se party‘s adherence to the court‘s 
procedural rules.  Additionally, the Model Rules expressly require an attorney 
to disclose confidential information in order to avoid committing a fraud 
against the court.
191
 
 
186. See infra notes 212–22 and accompanying text (setting out rules that some courts have 
developed to deal with otherwise pro se litigants who enter into discrete representation arrangements 
with attorneys). 
187. See Goldschmidt, supra note 25, at 1167, 1199 (asserting that ―American lawyers have a 
duty of confidentiality that protects against compelled disclosure‖ and that ―[i]f a pro se party desires 
that the details of his attorney-client relationship be kept confidential, the order to disclose the 
ghostwriter and the terms of the representation agreement would be an unprecedented violation of the 
attorney-client privilege‖). 
188. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2003) (stating that ―[a] lawyer shall 
not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed 
consent‖). 
189. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2003) (stating that ―[a] lawyer may 
reveal [client confidential] information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that 
is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and 
in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer‘s services‖). 
190. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. 
191. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c) (2002) (stating that ―[t]he duties in 
stated paragraphs (a) and (b) . . . apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information 
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6,‖ dealing with an attorney‘s duty to not disclose client confidential 
information); see also supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text (explaining the prohibition under 
Model Rule 3.3(a) against an attorney making misrepresentations to a court and the requirement 
under Model Rule 3.3(b) of taking ―reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary disclosure 
to the tribunal‖ to prevent or remedy ―fraudulent conduct [of other persons] related to the 
proceeding‖). 
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Furthermore, the attorney-client privilege normally does not cover the fact 
that an attorney represents a client.
192
  This results because this information 
does not involve a communication between an attorney and client.
193
  The 
only exception to this rule is if the revelation of the fact that the attorney 
represented the client would somehow ―reveal the content of a confidential 
communication,‖ either ―directly or by reasonable inference.‖194  Usually, this 
exception applies only when the revelation of the identity of the attorney‘s 
client will result in identifying the client as having been involved in some 
criminal endeavor.
195
 
 
192. See, e.g., United States v. Legal Servs. for N.Y. City, 249 F.3d 1077, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (―Courts have consistently held that the general subject matters of clients‘ representations are 
not privileged.‖); In re Grand Jury Matter No. 91-01386, 969 F.2d 995, 997 (11th Cir. 1992) (―The 
identity of a client and the receipt of attorney‘s fees normally are not privileged matters.‖); Dietz v. 
Doe, 935 P.2d 611, 617 (Wash. 1997) (―Ordinarily, the name of a client is not a confidential 
communication under the protection of the attorney-client privilege.‖); People v. Adam, 280 N.E.2d 
205, 207–08 (Ill. 1972) (concluding that the attorney-client privilege did not apply to testimony by 
the client that the client retained an attorney and identifying that attorney ―because the privilege 
applies only to communications made by [the client] to [her attorney]‖); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69 cmt. g (2000) (―Courts have sometimes asserted 
that the attorney-client privilege categorically does not apply to such matters as . . . the fact that the 
client consulted the lawyer and the general subject matter of the consultation.‖). 
193. See Legal Servs. for N.Y. City, 249 F.3d at 1081 (―Nor does the general purpose of a 
client‘s representation necessarily divulge a confidential professional communication, and therefore 
that data is not generally privileged.‖); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 
§ 69 cmt. g (2000) (stating that ―[t]estimony about such matters‖ as, among other things, ―the fact 
that the client consulted the lawyer and the general subject matter of the consultation‖ usually ―does 
not reveal the content of communications from the client‖); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68(1) (2000) (requiring, among other things, a ―communication‖ for 
the attorney-client privilege to apply).  The Restatement defines a ―communication‖ to be ―any 
expression through which a privileged person . . . undertakes to convey information to another 
privileged person.‖  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69 (2000). 
194. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69 cmt. g (2000); see also 
In re Grand Jury Matter, 969 F.2d at 997 (stating that an exception to the rule generally not 
protecting the identity of a client under the attorney-client privilege exists ―where disclosure of the 
identity would also reveal the privileged motive for the client to seek legal advice‖) (quoting In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings 88-9, 899 F.2d 1039, 1043 (11th Cir. 1990)). 
195. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Matter, 969 F.2d at 997 (―[Under] the ‗last link‘ 
doctrine . . . the identity of the client may become privileged because it ‗may well be the link that 
could form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the individual of a federal crime.‘‖) (quoting 
Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 633 (9th Cir. 1960)); United States v. Legal Servs. for N.Y. City, 
100 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D.D.C. 2000) (―Some courts . . . have recognized an ‗extremely narrow‘ 
exception to this rule, when disclosure would implicate the client in criminal wrongdoing, or when 
disclosure, in conjunction with information already provided, would be tantamount to revealing an 
‗indubitably confidential communication[ ].‘‖) (quoting In re Witnesses Before the Special March 
1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 1984)), aff’d, 249 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Dietz, 
935 P.2d at 617 (―[T]he ‗legal advice‘ exception . . . ‗which bars disclosure ―where the person 
invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such information 
would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought.‖‘‖) 
(quoting Seventh Elect Church in Israel v. Rogers, 688 P.2d 506, 509 (Wash. 1984)). 
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However, this exception does not apply to disclosure of attorney 
ghostwriting.  Revealing the fact that a nominal pro se client received legal 
assistance in preparing his or her pleadings by itself would not reveal any 
other privileged communication between the client and his or her attorney.  
Neither would this disclosure necessarily identify the client‘s involvement in 
some potential criminal endeavor for which the client originally sought the 
advice of the attorney.  Even if this information somehow would lead to the 
revelation of some other privileged communication, the attorney-client 
privilege, similar to an attorney‘s ethical duty of confidentiality, does not 
apply to communications in which the client ―uses the lawyer‘s advice or 
other services to engage in or assist a crime or fraud.‖196  Therefore, because 
the attorney‘s failure to disclose the assistance provided to the nominal pro se 
client arguably constitutes a fraud on the court, if not also on the opposing 
party, the attorney-client privilege would not cover the fact of the attorney‘s 
representation even under this scenario.  Thus, neither the attorney-client 
privilege nor an attorney‘s broader ethical duty of confidentiality to a client 
provides a justification for attorneys to fail to disclose that they drafted court 
documents for, or provided other legal assistance to, litigants presenting 
themselves to the court as proceeding pro se. 
V.  RECOMMENDATION TO REQUIRE DISCLOSURE OF GHOSTWRITING AND 
CONSIDER GHOSTWRITING TO CONSTITUTE A LIMITED APPEARANCE BY AN 
ATTORNEY 
In order to allow for the courts to fairly and efficiently adjudicate cases 
involving nominal pro se litigants, courts should require attorneys to disclose 
their conduct when they ghostwrite court documents for litigants otherwise 
proceeding pro se or provide some other limited legal services to such 
litigants.  Requiring ghostwriting attorneys to make such a disclosure would 
prevent courts from continuing to be liberal in interpreting the document 
concerned, which an attorney in fact drafted, and forgiving in applying its 
procedural rules to that document.
197
  Therefore, the nominal pro se litigant 
would not obtain an unfair advantage against his or her opponent through the 
attorney‘s limited provision of legal services. 
As set out above, despite protestations to the contrary in a few ethics 
opinions and by ghostwriting proponents, courts often have difficulty 
determining whether an attorney has drafted a document for a pro se litigant 
and are reluctant to conclude that attorney ghostwriting has occurred unless 
 
196. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 82(b) (2000). 
197. See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text (explaining the manner in which courts are 
required to liberally interpret pro se litigants‘ court documents throughout the lawsuit as well as 
giving pro se litigants considerable leeway in meeting procedural deadlines). 
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someone with actual knowledge of the attorney‘s conduct affirmatively states 
that such conduct actually has taken place.
198
  Thus, although not as egregious 
as bribing a judge or a juror, undetected ghostwriting does ―undermine[] the 
integrity of the adjudicative process‖199 by giving an unfair advantage to the 
nominal pro se litigant and does violate an attorney‘s duty to avoid 
committing a fraud on the court,
200
 as well as the attorney‘s duties to avoid 
fraud generally,
201
 to make truthful statements to third parties, and to avoid 
assisting a client to commit fraud.
202
 
Moreover, requiring disclosure of attorney ghostwriting of court 
documents, as well as the provision of other unbundled legal services to 
nominal pro se litigants, will allow an opposing party who was contemplating 
proceeding pro se to hire an attorney if he or she is able and desires to do so 
because that party will now be fully informed about the legal services that the 
nominal pro se party has received.
203
  If attorney ghostwriting is allowed to 
occur without disclosure, this could encourage attorneys to provide more 
extensive unbundled legal services to a nominal pro se litigant that could 
severely prejudice an opposing party who actually is proceeding pro se. 
For example, an attorney could engage in a more extensive ―stealth‖ 
representation where the attorney ghostwrites documents for the nominal pro 
se litigant periodically throughout the lawsuit and even provides legal and 
strategic advice to that party during settlement negotiations without the 
knowledge of an opposing pro se party.  An attorney might even appear on 
behalf of the nominal pro se litigant at a hearing to argue an important motion 
without the opposing party having any advance notice that the attorney would 
so appear.  In such situations, the opposing party is at a significant 
disadvantage when he or she is legitimately proceeding pro se without any 
legal assistance.  Such ―stealth‖ legal representations also present some 
additional and, perhaps, not immediately apparent thorny issues, such as 
whether a ―stealth‖ attorney assisting the nominal pro se litigant with 
analyzing the other side‘s discovery documents violates a protective order that 
 
198. See supra notes 63–68 and accompanying text. 
199. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmts. 2, 12 (2002). 
200. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002); see also supra notes 29–36 and 
accompanying text (discussing an attorney‘s duty of candor toward the court under Model Rule 3.3). 
201. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2002); see also supra note 37 and 
accompanying text (discussing an attorney‘s duty to avoid fraud generally under Model Rule 8.4(c)). 
202. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1, 1.2(d) (2002); see also supra notes 38–42 
and accompanying text (discussing an attorney‘s duty to avoid making false statements to third 
parties and assisting client fraud). 
203. See CAL. COMM‘N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 72.  (―There should be a level 
playing field for [an] opposing party in an unbundled situation.  If one side had known the other side 
had an attorney, instead of learning of it when, all of a sudden, an attorney appeared at a court 
hearing, they might have brought one too.‖). 
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a court has issued with regard to confidential documents that the opponent 
produced.
204
  Admittedly, such behavior goes beyond an attorney simply 
ghostwriting an initial pleading for a party that otherwise proceeds pro se 
through the rest of the lawsuit, but failing to require disclosure of attorney 
ghostwriting potentially opens the door to more extensive abuses by stealth 
counsel.  Thus, the best manner of dealing with attorney ghostwriting in order 
to prevent any unfair prejudice to the opposing party is to require the 
disclosure of such activity. 
Simply disclosing on the document concerned that counsel prepared it 
would prevent courts from inappropriately applying a liberal interpretation to 
the document concerned, and such disclosure would also prevent an opposing 
party from deciding to proceed pro se without knowledge of the legal 
assistance that the nominal pro se client was in fact receiving.  However, this 
limited disclosure would not provide the exact identity of the ghostwriting 
attorney and, thus, would not sufficiently deal with the efficiency concern of 
courts.
205
  Just knowing that some unnamed counsel prepared the document 
will still require a court to engage in an investigation to discover the 
attorney‘s identity should the court need to question the attorney about the 
accuracy of the law or facts contained in the document concerned.
206
  As 
pointed out above, being able to follow up with the preparing attorney quickly 
and efficiently is especially important in bankruptcy cases, an area in which 
litigants often appear pro se and where the initial petitions filed with the court 
often need to be amended in order to correct errors and omissions.
207
 
On the other hand, when a court document indicates the name of the 
attorney who drafted it for an otherwise pro se litigant, the court should not 
consider the attorney to have entered a general appearance for the litigant 
concerned and keep the attorney ―on the hook‖ for representing that litigant 
further in the lawsuit.
208
  In fact, in order to prevent requiring attorney 
 
204. See Norbert v. La. Med. Ctr., No. 05-1650, 2007 WL 1537021, at *2 (W.D. La. May 24, 
2007) (granting defendant‘s motion to prevent stealth counsel of pro se plaintiff from viewing 
defendant‘s sensitive personnel documents unless counsel made an official appearance in the case on 
behalf of the pro se plaintiff). 
205. See supra notes 77–83 and accompanying text (discussing the efficiency concerns that 
courts have expressed about ghostwriting). 
206. Beyond investigating some type of malfeasance on the part of either the pro se lit igant or 
the ghostwriting attorney, the court might also need to contact the ghostwriting attorney if the court 
perceives that the pro se litigant simply does not understand the legal arguments made in the 
ghostwritten documents sufficiently.  See Tebo, supra note 4, at 17 (discussing difficult ethics issues 
that ghostwriting raises identified by James McCauley, ethics counsel for the Virginia State Bar). 
207. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. 
208. See ABA HEARING REPORT, supra note 5, at 8 (―State ethics rules and rules of procedure 
should be examined and, where necessary, modified to permit limited representation that can be 
promoted and provided on a competitive, cost-effective basis.  Specific issues include ghostwriting, 
limited appearances, fee sharing and client development.‖). 
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disclosure of ghostwriting from discouraging attorneys from providing 
unbundled legal services, courts should consider such disclosure to constitute 
only a limited appearance.  Furthermore, courts should contact ghostwriting 
attorneys who reveal their identities only when the court determines that some 
type of problem exists with the document concerned, such as some type of 
inaccuracy or when the court suspects malfeasance. 
Therefore, it would be appropriate for attorneys who ghostwrite 
documents for litigants just to indicate their names on the documents 
concerned in some manner other than actually signing the documents 
concerned.  As set out above, such disclosure would not violate an attorney‘s 
duty of confidentiality to a client because the disclosure would be made in 
order to prevent a misrepresentation to the court and opposing counsel.
209
  
Similarly, such a disclosure would not breach the attorney-client privilege 
because the privilege does not cover the fact of the attorney‘s representation 
of the client concerned.
210
  However, if the attorney actually signs the 
document, this could constitute a general appearance.
211
  Instead, the litigant 
should sign the document, and the attorney should just note in another spot 
that counsel prepared the document along with counsel‘s name and contact 
information. 
Moreover, in order to encourage attorneys, despite the disclosure 
requirement, to provide unbundled legal services to litigants who otherwise 
would proceed entirely pro se, courts should develop explicit procedures that 
govern the manner in which attorneys make such disclosure and that explicitly 
state that an attorney making such a disclosure does not enter a general 
appearance on behalf of the client.  Courts that deal with areas in which pro se 
litigants are especially prevalent, such as domestic relations, housing, and 
bankruptcy courts, should especially consider developing such rules. 
Alternatively, states could revise their legal ethics rules so that they 
expressly require disclosure of attorney ghostwriting of court documents and 
state that such disclosure constitutes only a limited appearance in the litigation 
concerned.  Whether courts‘ local rules or states‘ professional responsibility 
rules are changed in this manner, the result would be the same—attorneys 
could provide limited legal services to litigants otherwise proceeding pro se in 
an open and honest fashion, and the contemplated disclosure would not serve 
as a disincentive to the provision of such unbundled services.  However, 
revision of states‘ legal ethics codes would probably accomplish this in a 
quicker and more widespread manner. 
 
209. See supra notes 188–91 and accompanying text. 
210. See supra notes 192–95 and accompanying text. 
211. See supra notes 87–88, 181–82 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of an 
attorney‘s signature on initial pleadings). 
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A few courts have already developed rules to accommodate the disclosure 
of attorneys having provided limited legal assistance to otherwise pro se 
litigants and that designate that such disclosure constitutes only a limited 
appearance by the attorney concerned.  For example, the rules of procedure 
for Florida family law courts require that an attorney disclose his or her 
identity on ―[a]ny pleading or other document filed by a limited appearance 
attorney.‖212  Furthermore, these rules require that ―[a] party who files a 
pleading or other document of record pro se with the assistance of an attorney 
shall certify that the party has received assistance from an attorney in the 
preparation of the pleading or other document.‖213  Florida‘s rules also allow 
for limited appearances by attorneys providing unbundled legal services for a 
client.
214
  Such attorneys must file ―a notice, signed by the party, specifically 
limiting the attorney‘s appearance only to the particular proceeding or matter 
in which the attorney appears.‖215  Then, ―[a]t the conclusion of such 
proceeding or matter, the attorney‘s role terminates without the necessity of 
leave of court, upon the attorney filing notice of completion of limited 
appearance.‖216  The filing of such notices at the beginning and end of the 
limited representation, as well as serving these notices on the other party or 
the party‘s counsel when applicable, should prevent any confusion on the part 
of the court or the other party as to when they should communicate with the 
nominal pro se litigant or with the litigant‘s attorney regarding a matter.217 
Similarly, Colorado has amended its rules of civil procedure to 
accommodate the provision of unbundled legal services.  Under Colorado‘s 
new Rule 11, attorneys who provide ―drafting assistance‖ to parties who file 
documents with a Colorado court as pro se must ―include the attorney‘s name, 
address, telephone number and registration number‖ on the document 
concerned.
218
  The attorney also must ―advise the pro se party that such 
pleading or other paper must contain this statement.‖219  Furthermore, ―[i]n 
 
212. FLA. FAM. LAW R. P. 12.040(e) (2007).  But see CAL. R. CT. FAM. R. 5.70 (2007) (―In a 
family law proceeding, an attorney who contracts with a client to draft or assist in drafting legal 
documents, but not to make an appearance in the case, is not required to disclose within the text of 
the document that he or she was involved in preparing the documents.‖). 
213. FLA. FAM. LAW R. P. 12.040(d) (2007). 
214. FLA. FAM. LAW R. P. 12.040(a) (2007); see also FLA. FAM. LAW R. P. 12.040(c) (2007) 
(―If an attorney appears of record for a particular limited proceeding or matter, as provided by this 
rule, that attorney shall be deemed ‗of record‘ for only that particular proceeding or matter.‖). 
215. FLA. FAM. LAW R. P. 12.040(a). 
216. FLA. FAM. LAW R. P. 12.040(c). 
217. See Farley, supra note 181, at 576–77 (discussing how the filing of notices and developing 
rules regarding when opposing counsel must contact the attorney providing limited legal services can 
prevent opposing counsel from improperly contacting the otherwise pro se litigant). 
218. COLO. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (2008). 
219. Id. 
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helping to draft the pleading or paper filed by the pro se party,‖ the attorney 
makes certifications to the court concerning the facts and law on which the 
document is based similar to those that the attorney would make if he or she 
actually had signed the document.
220
  Moreover, the rule explicitly states that 
―[l]imited representation of a pro se party under this Rule 11(b) shall not 
constitute an entry of appearance by the attorney‖ for the purpose of 
Colorado‘s rules governing appearances before Colorado courts and 
withdrawal.
221
 
Courts in Maine, Nevada, Washington, and Wyoming have enacted 
comparable appearance rules dealing with unbundled representation of 
litigants otherwise proceeding pro se.
222
  Therefore, a handful of courts have 
already taken steps to require disclosure of attorney ghostwriting of court 
documents for otherwise pro se litigants and ensure that such disclosure does 
not constitute a general appearance in the case from which the attorney will 
need court approval to withdraw.  However, many more jurisdictions should 
follow the lead of these courts and enact similar court or ethics rules requiring 
disclosure of the identity of attorneys who ghostwrite documents for litigants 
who otherwise proceed pro se and enabling this disclosure to constitute only a 
limited appearance by the ghostwriting attorney. 
 
220. Id. (―In helping to draft the pleading and paper filed by the pro se party, the attorney 
certifies that, to the best of the attorney‘s knowledge, information and belief, this pleading or paper is 
(1) well-grounded in fact based upon a reasonable inquiry of the pro se party by the attorney, (2) is 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of 
existing law, and (3) is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.‖); see also WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 
11(b) (2006) (imposing similar certification requirements for attorneys who ―help[ed] to draft a 
pleading, motion or document filed by the otherwise self-represented person‖). 
221. COLO. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (2008). 
222. See ME. CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY R. 3.4(i) (2002) (―If, after consultation, the 
client consents in writing (the general form of which is attached to these Rules), an attorney may 
enter a limited appearance on behalf of an otherwise unrepresented party involved in a court 
proceeding.‖); NEV. 8TH JUD. DIST. R. PRACT. 5.28 (2006) (requiring that an ―attorney who contracts 
with a client to limit the scope of representation‖ to ―state that limitation in the first paragraph of the 
first paper or pleading filed on behalf of that client‖ and stating that ―[a]n attorney who contracts 
with a client to limit the scope of representation shall be permitted to withdraw from [the] 
representation before the court by filing a Substitution of Attorney‖ that indicates that the ―service 
has been completed‖ and ―that the client will be representing himself or herself in proper person‖ and 
includes ―a copy of the limited services retainer agreement between the attorney and the client‖); 
WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 4.2(b) (2008) (―Providing limited representation of a person under these 
rules shall not constitute an entry of appearance by the attorney . . . .‖); WYO. UNIF. R. DIST. CTS. 
102(a)(1)(B) (2002) (―[A]n attorney who assisted in the preparation of a pleading and whose name 
appears on the pleading as having done so shall not be deemed to have entered an appearance in the 
matter . . . .‖). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Pro se litigants are a fact of life in state and federal courts today, 
especially in courts dealing with certain subject matter such as bankruptcy, 
housing, and family law.  Therefore, attorneys should be encouraged to 
provide unbundled legal services, including drafting of initial pleadings or 
other court documents, to such litigants who desire to receive these services 
and can afford them.  However, the provision of unbundled legal services to 
litigants who otherwise proceed pro se should not be encouraged at the 
expense of the opposing party, who is entitled to a fair and impartial 
adjudication as well as full disclosure regarding the legal services that the 
nominal pro se party actually is receiving.  Moreover, attorneys should not 
engage in a misrepresentation to the court, as well as to the opposing party, by 
engaging in undisclosed ghostwriting of documents. 
Therefore, states should develop either ethics or court rules that explicitly 
require attorneys to disclose their identities when they draft court documents 
for parties otherwise proceeding pro se.  At the same time, courts should not 
consider such disclosures to constitute a general appearance, which would 
require court approval before the attorney is allowed to withdraw from the 
representation.  Instead, courts should consider such a disclosure to constitute 
a limited appearance, if it is considered to be any type of appearance at all.  A 
few courts have already adopted rules doing this, but many more courts and 
jurisdictions still need to do so.  Only in this manner can courts and the bar 
promote the provision of unbundled legal services to otherwise pro se litigants 
while requiring disclosure of attorney ghostwriting to allow for the fair and 
efficient adjudication of the lawsuit involved.  
